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KEEPING FILES ON THE FILE KEEPERS: WHEN
PROSECUTORS ARE FORCED TO TURN OVER
THE PERSONNEL FILES OF FEDERAL AGENTS
TO DEFENSE LAWYERS
Lis Wiehl*
Abstract: The issue of whether criminal defense lawyers can compel federal prosecutors
during pre-trial discovery to examine and turn over information in the personnel files of
federal agents who will testify at trial has profoundly affected federal prosecutors, law
enforcement agents, and defense lawyers alike. Demands for discovery of these files have
risen steadily in recent years. In the hands of skilled defense counsel, information in a
personnel file can be used to impeach an agent on the witness stand. For agents and
prosecutors, much more is at stake than the way this information may be used at trial.
Professional reputations and morale are on the line. This Article surveys the federal cases in
the area, and discusses the marked split between the circuits on the issue. The Article analyzes
the procedures by which the U.S. Department of Justice and the various federal law
enforcement agencies have attempted to comply with rulings that have given defendants
easier access than before to the personnel files of federal agents. The Article concludes with
some proposals for change-ways in which the concerns of prosecutors and law enforcement
agencies can be addressed without compromising a defendant's access to evidence that could
affect the verdict.
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Discovery of Federal Agents' Personnel Files
[Defendant claims] that the trial court should have granted his
discovery requests for impeaching material on the law enforcement
officers who testified against [him at trial]. [He] argues that he
should have had access to material from the witnesses'personnel
files which might have been impeaching....
[But he] concedes that there is no suggestion that the personnel
files actually contained information which was impeaching ...
. . .[He] was not entitled to the personnel files of the law
enforcement witnesses without even a hint that impeachment
material was contained therein.
United States v. Andrus'
[The government has a duty to examine personnel files [offederal
agents who will testify at trial] upon a defendant's request for their
production. Absent such an examination, it cannot ordinarily
determine whether it is obligated to turn over the files.
The government is incorrect in its assertion that it is the
defendant's burden to make an initial showing of materiality. The
obligation to examine the files arises by virtue of the making of a
demandfor their production.
United States v. Henthorn2
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses an important issue in federal criminal law:
whether criminal defendants can compel federal prosecutors during pre-
trial discovery to review and turn over the personnel files of law
enforcement officers who will testify at trial.3 The personnel files of
1. 775 F.2d 825, 842-43 (7th Cir. 1985).
2. 931 F.2d 29,31 (9th Cir. 1991).
3. The scope of this Article is limited primarily to a discussion of federal criminal case law. With a
few exceptions indicated in the text, the Article does not discuss state law. Additionally, the Article does
not address Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 in detail, nor does it discuss case law dealing with the
use of subpoenas in civil or criminal cases, or certain federal statutory regulations, including privacy and
accounting of disclosure requirements, that may have an impact under certain circumstances on the
information that the government can disclose.
Courts have yet to address squarely a closely related issue, namely, whether or when prosecutors must
review or turn over information in the personnel file of an agent who has worked on the case against the
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federal agents often contain extremely sensitive material, including job
performance reviews, grievances filed by private citizens, and the records
of reprimands or disciplinary proceedings. In the hands of skilled defense
attorneys, much of this information could be used to impeach an agent's
credibility on the witness stand.4 Although federal agents may be
accustomed to keeping files on other people, they are extremely reluctant
to allow the people whom they investigate (and even the prosecutors
with whom they work) to delve into the files that contain the most
private details of their working lives.
As defense lawyers have increasingly sought access to these files,5
federal courts have increasingly attempted to devise rules governing the
review and disclosure of information that the files contain. What has
emerged is a distinct split among several appellate circuits over a
threshold issue: must the defendant be made to show that an agent's
personnel file will yield something of impeachment value before a court
will even consider ordering the prosecutor to review the file for
information that should be disclosed?
As the law presently stands in a number of circuits, a defendant must
make a prior showing that an agent's personnel file will y.eld something
materially impeaching before the government will be required to review
the file for information that should be disclosed.6 In these circuits, it is
defendant but who will not be called as a government witness at trial. A pre-trial discovery request for
the personnel file of an agent who will not be called as a government witness would likely be decided
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(C) and case law on that rule, and is beyond the scope
of this Article. Rule 16(a)(1)(C) governs the discovery of evidence that the government does not intend
to use at trial, but that is "material to the preparation of the defendant's defense." See Fed. R. Crim. P.
16(a)(1)(C). The general rule is that a defendant who seeks discovery under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) has the
burden of making a prima facie showing that the requested information is material to his defense. 2
Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 254, at 66-67 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1996).
All of these areas are ripe for discussion in another forum.
4. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
5. Memorandum from Dennis F. Hoffmnan, Chief Counsel, Drug Enforcement Administration, to All
U.S. Attorneys Within the Ninth Circuit (Mar. 27, 1995) (on file with Washington Law Review); Letter
from Leland E. Lutfy, U.S. Attorney, District of Nevada, to J.J. Skidmore, Postal Inspector in Charge,
U.S. Postal Inspection Service (Aug. 12, 1991) (on file with Washington Lav Review); Memorandum
from Robert S. Mueller, II, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
to All U.S. Attorneys Within the Ninth Circuit (Aug. 12, 1991) (on file with Washington Lav Review);
Survey by Lis Wiehl of Federal Public Defenders' offices (sent Aug. 13, 1996) (results on file with
Washington Lmv Review) [hereinafter Survey of Federal Public Defenders] (see infra note 193).
6. Circuits that have clearly gone this way are the Sixth Circuit (see United States v. Valentine, No.
94-6195, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16584, at *1 (6th Cir. June 30, 1995); United States v. Driscoll, 970
F.2d 1472 (6th Cir. 1992)); the Seventh Circuit (see United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.
1985); United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1984)); and the D.C. Circuit (see United States
v. Lafayette, 983 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Lampkin, Crim. Action No. 96-0103
(JHG), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7262, at *1 (D.D.C. May 28, 1996)). An Eleventh Circuit panel (like the
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entirely possible (even probable) that a file rife with impeachment
material will never be reviewed by the prosecutor, let alone disclosed to
the defendant, if the defendant cannot make a predicate showing that
there is something significant in the file. By contrast, as the law presently
stands in the Ninth Circuit, which includes the federal courts for most of
the western United States,7 a defendant's discovery request for an agent's
personnel file is enough to trigger the government's obligation to review
the agent's personnel file for impeachment material.
The clash between these circuits has produced a plaguing anomaly.
Although a prosecutor's obligation to turn over exculpatory or
impeachment information once she is aware of it is governed by a single
set of rules in all the circuits,8 her obligation to look for such information
in the first place is governed by divergent standards and depends
dramatically on which circuit's law applies. This divergence between the
circuits affects the way the government prosecutes criminal cases in
federal court. For example, the prosecutor who is required to review an
agent's personnel file for impeachment material may find entries that
will force her to make a more favorable plea offer to the defendant, or to
scramble to find another agent to testify. The prosecutor who is not
required to review or disclose impeachment information in the file may
have an advantage during plea negotiations with a defendant who lacks
the resources to discover the agent's history through independent
investigation. But, in those cases where the defendant manages to
discover the agent's history independently, the prosecutor who is not
required to examine the personnel file may find herself "ambushed" at
trial by a defense attorney who knows more about the agent than she
does.
Part II of this Article surveys the federal cases in which courts have
addressed the issue of when the government's lawyer must review the
personnel files of agents who will testify at trial. The Article documents
the development of the split among the circuits on this issue, and, after
chronicling this history, discusses a 1995 U.S. Supreme Court decision
Seventh Circuit) reached the same result as the courts in Andrus and Navarro. See United States v.
Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 1989), in which the court held that a federal prosecutor was not
required to search the files of local police agencies for potentially exculpatory material. The defendant
had failed to make any showing that such material existed in the files.
7. The Ninth Circuit includes the following states and territories: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam.
8. Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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that, though not directly on point, may offer a preview of how the Court
may resolve this split.
Part III of the Article describes the attempts by the U.S. Department of
Justice and the various federal law enforcement agencies to adapt to the
new reality of increasing discovery demands for agency personnel files.
As defendants' requests for discovery of these files have multiplied, the
agencies have tried to devise uniform protocols for reviewing the files
for impeachment material. However, while the Department of Justice and
the agencies have publicly suggested that their protocols are consistent
with each other and with the developing law, their public posture has
belied some significant differences in their approaches--differences
reflecting a fierce debate between agents and prosecutors over how much
review and disclosure the law requires of them. Some of the appellate
decisions have produced some unintended consequences, as government
lawyers and agents have found ways to comply narrowly with (or thwart)
discovery requests for personnel files.
Finally, part IV offers some proposals for resolving the split between
the circuits, urging the adoption of a single, nationwide standard that
would better address the privacy concerns of the law enforcement
community and the due process concerns of criminal defendants than the
divergent standards that are currently in force. The proposal would
winnow the number of discovery requests for files. Defense attorneys
could no longer make blanket requests for personnel files, as they can
now do in the Ninth Circuit. However, defense attorneys in most of the
circuits would gain easier access to relevant information in the files than
they presently have.
II. THE LAW
A. Pre-Henthorn
1. 1963 (Brady) Through 1984 (Cadet)
The federal case law9 prior to 1984 pertaining to the pre-trial
discoverability of agency personnel files can be described as a kind of
patchwork with no unifying theme. The starting point of any discussion
of the law in this area is the U.S. Supreme Court's 1963 decision in
9. With a few exceptions, this Article discusses federal law only. For a review of the state cases
involving state police officers and prior complaints against them, see Jeffrey Ghent, Annotation,
Accused's Right to Discovery or Inspection of Prior Complaints Against, or Similar Personnel
Records of Peace Officers Involved in the Case, 86 A.L.R.3d 1170 (1995).
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Brady v. Maryland,'0 in which the Court laid down the broad rule that
suppression by the prosecution of requested evidence favorable to the
accused violates due process where the evidence is material, either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecutor." While the Brady decision spoke of the prosecutor's duty to
divulge exculpatory material in his possession, it did not command
prosecutors to affirmatively search for exculpatory material of which
they were not aware. In Giglio v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court
later determined that evidence impeaching the credibility of a
government witness falls within the Brady rule when the reliability of the
witness is critical to the jury's determination of the defendant's guilt.' 2
In the 1960s and early 1970s a smattering of post-Brady decisions
established and reiterated that Brady did not supply defendants with a
basis for pre-trial discovery in any form. 3 Potential Brady violations
were only to be addressed post-conviction. In looking at whether the
statements of government witnesses should be disclosed to the defense
pre-trial, a federal district court for the Southern District of New York
said, in United States v. Manhattan Brush Co., "[W]hile the Government
has an important duty to conduct criminal prosecutions fairly, its
obligations must be examined and tested after trial, not before.' 4 The
courts had not yet wrestled with the issue of agents' personnel files per
se. Instead, the cases involved requests to inspect, for example, a
testifying agent's notes"s and evidence of inconsistency in a witness' pre-
trial identification. 6 In these early cases, every court that considered the
issue of whether the defendant was entitled to pre-trial discovery of
government files decided firmly in favor of nondisclosure-until 1973.
10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
11. Id. at 87.
12. 405 U.S. 150, 155 (1972) (holding that prosecution's duty to present all material evidence to
jury was not fulfilled where Government failed to disclose alleged promise of leniency made to its
key witness in return for his testimony); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985)
("[lmpeachment evidence ... as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule."). In
Bagley, the Court established the materiality standard applicable when the prosecutor fails to
disclose requested information to the defense that could have been used to impeach a government
witness.
13. United States v. Moore, 439 F.2d 1107 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487
(1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
14. Manhattan Brush, 38 F.R.D. at 7.
15. Id. at4.
16. DeLeo, 422 F.2d at 498.
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In United States v. Deutsch," a Fifth Circuit panel considered whether
a defendant was entitled to discovery of the personnel file of the
government's key witness. The defendant, charged with attempted
bribery of a postal worker, had made a pre-trial discovery request for the
production of the personnel file of the postal worker whom he had
allegedly sought to bribe. The prosecution opposed the request on the
grounds that it did not have physical possession of the file, and that the
Post Office was not an "arm of the prosecution" and could not, therefore,
be ordered to produce the file.'8
In remanding the case to the district court to examine the file for
impeachment material, the panel relied heavily on the fact that the
agent's testimony was the government's "whole case."' 9 In Deutsch, the
prosecutor argued that he should not be compelled to inspect the relevant
personnel files without the defendant first making a showing that the
records contained material relevant to his defense.20 Although the Fifth
Circuit panel did not rule on whether the defense must make such a
showing before triggering the prosecutor's obligation to inspect, the
court did stretch to find that the defendant had met this burden, if there
was one.
2
'
After Deutsch, the next federal appellate decision on the personnel file
issue was a Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Muse,22 in which the
17. 475 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1973).
18. The Sixth Circuit summarized it as follows:
Before trial defendants moved for the production of [postal worker] Morrison's personnel file,
for "insight into the character of said prospective witness," citing Brady v. Maryland, 1963, 373
U.S. 83. The U.S. Attorney responded, "This office does not have the personnel file of D. F.
Morrison." The [district court] ruled, "[T]he prosecution cannot be compelled to disclose
something which it does not have. Furthermore, the Post Office Department does not appear to
be an arm of the prosecution as contemplated by Brady."
Id. at 57 (parallel citation omitted).
19. Id. at 58.
20. Id.
21. The court recited the following portion of the transcript:
But if there is any burden on the defendants of suggesting a possibility of favorable evidence we
note the evasive testimony of Morrison at the trial.
Q. Have you ever had any problems with the Supervisor?
A. No sir.
Q. About your personal appearance, or anything?
A. Personal appearance where they thought my hair may be too long. It was unjustified.
Q. Justified?
A. Unjustified. I had been down to see Mr. Camp. He said there was nothing wrong with it.
Id.
22. 708 F.2d 513, 516-17 (10th Cir. 1983).
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panel voted to affirm the district court's denial of a defendant's pre-trial
request for production of the personnel files of government agents who
would testify against him at trial. The panel agreed with the broad
language of Deutsch on the government's obligation to turn over
information that could be used for impeachment purposes, but held that
the trial court's refusal to order production of the personnel files had not
been error "because the court did in fact order production of all material
favorable or useful to the defense."'
While the Muse case emphasized the prosecutor's duty to disclose
impeachment material, it did not address some important questions. Must
the prosecutor inspect the personnel files on her own initiative, or may
she wait until the defense has requested the files? Should the defendant
be required to make some prima facie showing that the file is likely to
yield something exculpatory or impeaching before the prosecutor will be
made to review the file? Nothing in the Muse decision (or many
subsequent decisions in other circuits, discussed infra) compelled the
prosecutor to examine an agent's personnel file to uncover impeachment
material, even after a request by the defense. The Muse court reiterated
the prosecutor's general obligation to turn over impeachment material
but said nothing about whether a prosecutor has an affirmative duty to
look at the file in order to discover any impeachment material that might
be found there.24
Then, in 1984, a three-judge panel25 of the Ninth Circuit ordered the
government on remand to submit the personnel records of government
23. Id. at 517. The court questioned, but did not decide, whether the government was correct in its
contention that the defendant's request for the agents' personnel files was merely a "fishing
expedition."
24. Between 1973 and 1984 several other federal district and state courts addressed the issue of
personnel files in criminal pre-trial discovery. A federal district judge in Delaware denied a
defendant's request for
Any and all personnel files for the witness, the existence and identity of all federal, state and
local government files for the witness and the existence and identity of all official internal
affairs, internal investigation or public integrity investigation files relating to or connected with
each witness who was or is a law enforcement officer.
United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 444, 501 (D. Del. 1980). The court held that this request was
not for matters material to the preparation of the defense as required by Brady. Id.; see also United
States v. Akers, 374 A.2d 874 (D.C. 1977) (reversing lower court's order compelling discovery of
police personnel files because not usable for impeachment or material for client counseling); State v.
Butts, 640 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (denying defendant's request for police personnel
files because defendant failed to demonstrate "sufficient materiality" to warrant disclosure of files).
25. The three judges were Arthur L. Alarcon, William C. Canby, Jr., and Stephen Reinhardt.
Seven years later in 1991, Judge Reinhardt would write the seminal opinion in United States v.
Henthom, 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991).
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agents to the trial court for an in camera inspection for Brady material.26
The requests for the files had been made, ostensibly, in support of an
entrapment or outrageous conduct defense. The prosecutor argued that
the defendants must make some showing of materiality before his review
of the file should be required.
[This] is an unwarranted intrusion. There is absolutely no reason
why they should go into the personnel records of government
agents who were involved in this particular case. There has been
nothing advanced by these defendants as to why those records
would be helpful to them. I think this is an intrusion on [sic] the
privacy of these individuals without some kind of a showing that
this [sic] relevant to a defense in this case.27
Although the panel in United States v. Cadet found that the lower
court had abused its discretion in ordering the government to produce the
personnel files in their entirety, it nevertheless ordered the government to
submit the files to the lower court on remand, for review and disclosure
of any information material to the defense.2" As in Deutsch, the
government argued that the defendants' request should be denied
because they had not made a prior showing of materiality.2 9 Writing for
the panel, Judge Alarcon dismissed that argument rather caustically:
No order was necessary to compel the government to accord due
process to these defendants. Before this court, the government
again offered to examine the personnel files for Brady material.
That duty should have been performed in August of 1982, as soon
as the government was made aware of the defendant's request for
the personnel files in order to assist the defendants in their trial
preparation. The prosecutor's oath of office, not the command of a
federal court, should have compelled the government to produce
26. United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). In Cadet the government appealed
from the trial court's judgment dismissing with prejudice a four-count indictment against three
defendants. The indictment charged the defendants with transporting, receiving, and selling
documents belonging to a corporation (IBM). Defendants Saffaie's and Ayazi's exhaustive
discovery motion included a request for "[p]roduction of all government personnel or other files
pertaining to FBI Special Agents Alan J. Garretson and Mary B. Williams." Id. at 1457.
27. Id at 1457 n.7.
28. Id at 1470. The panel set forth some procedural guidelines for review and disclosure of a
personnel file: "If the prosecution is uncertain about the materiality of information within its
possession, it may submit the information to the trial court for an in camera inspection and
evaluation." Id. (quoting United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 775 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))).
29. Id. at 1467.
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any favorable evidence in the personnel records. While we cannot
condone the prosecutor's recalcitrant behavior, it is evident to us
the court abused its discretion in ordering disclosure of the entire
personnel file without first conducting an in camera inspection to
determine whether the files contained any Brady material.3"
The Cadet decision made it clear that no prior showing of materiality
need be made-the defendant's request alone was enough to trigger the
prosecutor's obligation to look for Brady material in an agent's personnel
file.3"
2. 1984 (Cadet) Through 1991 (Henthom)
The Cadet decision went relatively unnoticed by the defense bar,
prosecutors, and legal scholars in the Ninth Circuit.32 Federal district
courts in other circuits continued to deny defendants' motions for review
of government personnel files unless the defendants could make a prior
showing of materiality.3 The same was true at the appellate level. In the
Seventh Circuit, for example, the panel in United States v. Andrus34
30. Id. at 1467-68 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 1467-68.
32. This assertion is based on several dozen interviews with defense lawyers, federal prosecutors,
and legal scholars, and on the dearth of Federal Ninth Circuit cases on the personnel file issue
following Cadet, and before Henthorn. The interviews were conducted between May and September,
1996.
The Henthorn case, decided seven years after Cadet, is generally regarded as the seminal case in
the Ninth Circuit. One reason may be the increased media attention surrounding the Henthorn
decision. See Robb London, New Weapon for the Defense: Files on U.S. Agents, N.Y. Times, June 7,
1991, at B7; Airtel communication from Louis J. Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), to all Special Agents in Charge, (Nov. 27, 1995) (on file with Washington Law
Review). It was not until Henthorn that defense lawyers seemed to become aware that they could ask
for the personnel files of testifying law enforcement agents. See Interview with C. James Frush,
Defense Attorney, in Bainbridge Island, Wash. (Aug. 21, 1996).
33. In Illinois: United States v. Quintanilla, 760 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Il. 1991), affd, 2 F.3d 1469
(7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Dominguez, 131 F.R.D. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1990); United States v. Cole,
707 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1989); United States v. Dicaro, No. 88 Cr 923, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2056, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 1989); United States v. McDonnell, 696 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Il. 1988).
In Kansas: United States v. McClennon, Nos. 90-10045-01, 90-10045-02, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13203, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 7, 1990); United States v. Cooper, Crim. Action No. 89-10025-01, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13452, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 19, 1989). In New York: United States v. Rufolo, No.
89 Cr. 938 (KMW), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2697, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1990); United States v.
Davis, No. 89-CR-89, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14678, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1989).
34. 775 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1985). The appeal followed the conviction of defendant Andrus and
others of conspiring to distribute cocaine. One of the agents who testified against Andrus (and whose
personnel file had been requested) had acted in an undercover capacity in the case, posing as a
potential buyer of cocaine..
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upheld the trial court's denial of the defendants' request for access to
government personnel files for all of the law enforcement witnesses in
the case. The court focused on the defendant's failure to make a showing
that the files contained impeachment material:
Mere speculation that a government file may contain Brady
material is not sufficient to require a remand for in camera
inspection, much less reversal for a new trial. A due process
standard which is satisfied by mere speculation would convert
Brady into a discovery device and impose an undue burden upon
the district court.3"
Other appellate panels in the Seventh Circuit ruled that a defendant's
discovery request for a personnel file would not be granted absent a prior
showing that the file would contain material that could change a guilty
verdict.36 In United States v. Navarro, the court fcund that the
speculative assertion that a particular file might contain impeaching
material was not, by itself, enough to force the government to produce
the file for the court's inspection.37 Still another Seventh Circuit panel
reaffirmed this position even more broadly, upholding the district court's
denial of the defendant's discovery motion seeking access to the FBI's
file on a government informant. In United States v. Phillips, the appellate
court said:
We reiterate that a Brady request does not entitle a criminal
defendant to embark upon an unwarranted fishing expedition
through government files, nor does it mandate that a trial judge
conduct an in camera inspection of the government's files in every
case. Such matters are committed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge.38
35. Id. at 843 (citing United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1984), in which court
upheld district court's denial of defendant's motion for discovery of Immigration and Naturalization
Service files relating to government informant who testified at trial).
36. United States v. Romo, 914 F.2d 889, 898-99 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Andrus, 775 F.2d 825;
Navarro, 737 F.2d 625).
37. Navarro, 737 F.2d at 631.
38. United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 1988).
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B. Henthorn to Today--The Split Between the Circuits
1. The Ninth Circuit and the Rule of Henthorn
Seven years after Cadet, and six years after Andrus, a Ninth Circuit
panel held squarely that upon a defendant's request, the government has
a duty to examine the personnel files of testifying agent witnesses for
evidence material to the defendant's case.39 That court held that the
defense need not make any prior showing that impeachment material will
be found in the agent's personnel file. Rather, the government's duty to
look through a file is triggered by the defendant's request alone.
Following his conviction for various drug offenses, Donald Henthom
filed a pro se appeal alleging twelve different categories of error by the
district court, each of which, he argued, had precluded him from
obtaining a fair trial.4" The government responded that it had "no
obligation to examine the personnel files absent a showing by the
defendant that they contained information material to his defense.",4' The
trial court had denied Henthom's discovery motion because he had made
no showing of materiality.42 Henthorn cited no specific legal precedent in
39. United States v. Henthom, 931 F.2d 29, 31 (9th Cir. 1991). Henthom appealed from his
conviction after a jury trial on charges of conspiracy to import and possess cocaine with intent to
distribute, and travel in interstate and foreign commerce in aid of racketeering enterprises. Henthom
claimed that the district court erred in denying his discovery request for impeachment material
contained in the testifying officers' personnel files.
40. Brief of the Appellant at ii-ii(a), Henthorn (No. 88-5299). Henthom raised a spectrum of
potential abuses, ranging from hearsay violations, to allegations of "trial by ambush," to
"interdiction of the truth-seeking process," to various forms of government misconduct, including
"witness tampering" and "suppression of evidence." Included in the myriad alleged errors was the
claim that the government had erred in denying his request to produce the personnel files of all
testifying law enforcement officers. Id. at 20.
41. Henthorn, 931 F.2d at 29.
42. The trial court concluded that Henthorn had failed to meet his obligation of identifying a
"specific wrongdoing" before obtaining the right to have the court review the files in camera. Id. at
30. Thus, the trial court appears to have adhered to the standard followed in those circuits in which a
prosecutor's duty to review a file hinged on the defendant's obligation to first make a prima facie
showing that the file would reveal something materially impeaching or exculpatory. This was
certainly at odds with the implicit logic of the Ninth Circuit's view in Cadet.
Ironically, after the appellate decision, Henthorn himself still could not identify any specific
wrongdoing by the agents: "I'd seen them in action for some time, and I figured there was a good
chance that if anybody had something in their files it would be these two guys, so I asked for the
files." London, supra note 32, at B7.
The following excerpts from his appellate brief are the closest Henthorn came to making any kind
of showing or allegation of misconduct on the part of the law enforcement agents:
During the post arrest sequence, the case agent for the McAllen, Texas D.E.A., agent Mike
Harper, told both Henthom and Riley that the rest of the Baramdyka organization members had
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his pro se appeal brief to support his claim of error regarding the trial
court's denial of access to the personnel records.
In the appellee's brief to the Ninth Circuit, the Assistant U.S. Attorney
(AUSA) responded succinctly to Henthorn on the issue of his request for
the personnel files:
4. Judge Turrentine properly denied the appellant's motion to
inspect the personnel records of testifying law enforcement officers
for lack of sufficient showing (RT 2/18/88 at 43-48). United States
v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1984)."
In a telephone interview five years after the decision, the prosecutor
said that he felt compelled to include Cadet in his brief, even though it
had not been cited by Donald Henthorn in his appeal because he felt that
it was "the right and ethical thing to do even though it could hurt the
case.'54
4
Judge Reinhardt wrote the opinion for the three-judge panel.45 Citing
Cadet, Judge Reinhardt wrote that the government had been incorrect in
asserting that the defendant must make an initial showing of materiality.
"The obligation to examine the files," he wrote, "arises by virtue of the
making of a demand for their production."'t 6 The panel remanded the case
been arrested in California, and that those arrested were giving incriminating statements to the
California agents which inculpated Henthom and Riley as members of the Baramdyka
organization.
On more than one occasion, agent Harper took Henthorn from the Edinberg, Texas jail cell
without the presence of counsel and proceeded to interrogate and attempt to persuade the
Appellant to accept a Government proffered attorney, Mr. Neal DuVall, plus made several offers
of a plea agreement in exchange for peijured testimony from the Appellant.
Brief of the Appellant at 3, Henthorn (No. 88-5299).
43. Brief for the Appellee at 34, Henthorn (No. 88-5299).
44. Telephone Interview with Roger W. Haines, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern
District of California (Aug. 8, 1996). Haines was counsel for the government in Henthorn.
45. The two other judges were Harry Pregerson and Cynthia Holcomb Hall. The panel plucked
this issue from among all the others raised by Henthorn as worthy of a published opinion. "Appellant
raises a number of other issues which we resolve in a separate memorandum disposition filed
concurrently herewith." Henthorn, 931 F.2d at 30 n.1. The appeal was decided on the briefs, without
oral argument.
46. Id at 31. The opinion further stated:
In United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1984), we set forth the procedure the
prosecution must follow when confronted with a request by a defendant for the personnel files
of testifying officers. We stated that the government must "disclose information favorable to the
defense that meets the appropriate standard of materiality .... If the prosecution is uncertain
about the materiality of information within its possession, it may submit the information to the
trial court for an in camera inspection and evaluation...." As we noted in Cadet, the
government has a duty to examine personnel files upon a defendant's request for their
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to the district court for an in camera review of the personnel files that
Henthorn had requested.47
2. The Immediate Reaction to Henthorn in the Ninth Circuit-
Prosecutors, Law Enforcement Agents, and Defense Counsel
Unlike the Cadet decision of 1984, Henthorn drew the immediate
attention of the law enforcement community, defense lawyers, and the
media. Several weeks after the decision, The New York Times ran a
lengthy article on the decision entitled "New Weapon for the Defense:
Files on U.S. Agents. 48 The article outlined much of the substance of the
decision and predicted that it would stir up great debate in the federal law
enforcement community.49 A great many defense lawyers must have read
the Henthorn opinion or the New York Times article about it because
discovery requests for personnel files of government agents soared."
Criminal defense lawyers who had been practicing in the Ninth Circuit
at the time of Cadet and had never made a discovery request for agents'
personnel files suddenly realized that they could ask for (and get) an
inspection of the personnel files of agents who were going to testify at
trial.5 The media touted the Henthorn opinion as a "new weapon" for
production. Absent such an examination, it cannot ordinarily determine whether it is obligated
to turn over the files.
Id. at 30-31 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 31. On remand, the district court conducted an in camera review of the files, and did not
order that anything be turned over. The conviction was ultimately affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.
Henthom filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court on other grounds, which was
denied. Henthom v. United States, 503 U.S. 972 (1992).
48. London, supra note 32, at B7.
49. "The ruling has touched off intense debate between law-enforcement officials and members of
the defense bar, pitting the privacy rights of Federal agents against the right of defendants to see
evidence that could impeach the credibility of witnesses." Id.
50. Letter from Lutfy, supra note 5. Lutfy stated:
As a result of the Ninth Circuit decision in U.S. v. Henthorn, our office has received motions by
defense counsel seeking Brady material contained in the personnel files of our agent witnesses. I
have had a number of discussions with personnel in the Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice concerning the scope of what needs to be done by the Government when we receive a
request for Brady material concerning an agent's personnel file.
Id. The letter was copied to all Criminal Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
51. Telephone Interview with Frush, supra note 32; Telephone Interview with Haines, supra note
44; Telephone Interview with Frank Z. Leidman, Law Offices of Frank Z. Leidman (Aug. 12, 1996).
The first such request may have been made midway through a federal murder-for-hire trial in the
Western District of Washington that went to trial in Seattle only weeks after the Henthorn decision.
The FBI, primarily through the work of the lead case agent, had conducted an extensive investigation
into the defendant's personal history and had worked closely with the intended victim and with the
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defense lawyers, and for the first time, prosecutors and agents began to
feel an uneasy tug between two players on the same team. This tension is
discussed more fully in part III.
The Department of Justice swiftly issued an official response to the
Henthorn ruling, an action that it had not taken after the Cadet decision.
In a memorandum sent to all the United States Attorneys in the Ninth
Circuit, the Department acknowledged that the Henthorn decision had
"prompted a spate of motions by defense counsel seeking Brady material
contained in the personnel files of our agent witnesses."52 The
Department issued the memorandum in order to "offer some guidance
regarding how you should respond to such motions."'53
It seemed paradoxical for the Department to move so quickly to
circulate a memorandum of guidance while insisting that Henthorn did
not change the law. "First, we do not read Henthorn as changing the law
in the Ninth Circuit or our duty to disclose under Brady."4 To the extent
that Henthorn had simply made explicit what had been merely implicit in
Cadet, the Department's memorandum was correct in assessing that
Henthorn had not "changed" the law in the Ninth Circuit. But the
Department's view that Henthorn had not changed the Government's
"duty to disclose under Brady" was misleading. It missed the salient
point-that prosecutors who, prior to Cadet and Henthorn, rarely had a
ostensible "hit man" in putting together the case against the defendant. The case agent's testimony at
trial was considered absolutely crucial to the successful prosecution of the case. Midway through
trial, the defense counsel sent a one paragraph letter to the prosecutor requesting an inspection of the
case agent's personnel file, pursuant to United States v. Henthorn. The prosecutor telephoned the
agent's supervisor at the FBI and asked that he be allowed to review the personnel file in order to
formulate a response to the request The Bureau's response was succinct, as recalled later by the
prosecutor in an interview: 'Ain't no way, no how. We will designate an appropriate person within
the office to review the file. But we will not let anybody in the United States Attorney's Office have
unfettered access to the personnel files of our agents.'
Refusing to take no for an answer, the prosecutor subsequently met with the Special Agent in
Charge and the Legal Advisor of the regional field office to reiterate his request to inspect the file.
Again, he was told that the FBI took its obligation seriously, but that the agency would review the
file and then report to the prosecutor. "I felt an uneasy compromise had been struck," said the
prosecutor of that meeting. Telephone Interview with Gene Porter, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the
Western District of Washington (Aug. 13, 1996)
The FBI completed a review of the case agent's personnel file and reported back orally to the
Assistant U.S. Attorney who felt satisfied with the thoroughness of the review. The prosecutor then
filed a written response with defense counsel indicating that the review had been completed and that
he had nothing to disclose. Id. The case was United States v. Lees, Dist. Ct. No. CR 90-0260 D
(W.D. Wash. 1991). Defense counsel was C. James Frush.
52. Memorandum from Mueller, supra note 5, at 1.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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duty to look at, let alone disclose, the contents of personnel files, were
now required to look if asked. Prior to Cadet and Henthorn, prosecutors
had been under no pressure to inquire into the existence of exculpatory
or impeachment material in personnel files. Now, they had no choice but
to do so upon request.
The Justice Department Memorandum went on to inform prosecutors
of what Henthorn did not encompass, and what they were not required to
do to meet the demands of "Henthorn requests," as they had already
come to be known." In light of this, the fact that the Department elected
not to pursue an appeal of the Henthorn decision is somewhat surprising.
The Assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted Henthorn and wrote the
appellate brief said, "I think the Department felt that the Court had made
the right decision. I reported it [to the Department] as an adverse opinion,
but they were not willing to take it up with the Solicitor General."56
55. Id. at 2. The memorandum told prosecutors the following: they need not inspect the files
themselves, but could ask the agencies to review the files of their employees, because the Ninth
Circuit had not specifically held that the prosecutor must personally review the file; Henthorn did
not require the inspection of personnel files of non-federal agents nor those of federal agents who
would not testify at trial; and, the Henthorn inspection need not include a review of the agent's
background security investigation performed prior to employment.
Although the background check may have disclosed some derogatory information about the
agent, he probably would not have been hired if the information rose to the level of perjurious
conduct or otherwise qualified as "material" under Brady. In essence, each agent has gone
through a Henthorn search as a condition of employment and there is no need to repeat that
search each time he testifies.
Id.
In the same memorandum, the Department's lawyers concluded further that: (1) if Brady material
were found in a file, the agent should be notified before the prosecutor submitted the material to the
court for in camera inspection; and (2) prosecutors could negotiate with defense counsel to "try to
get defense counsel to agree to dispense with a search of the personnel files of chain-of-custody
witnesses and to settle for a search of the files of those agents whose credibility will actually be
contested at trial." Id. at 2.
56. Telephone Interview with Haines, supra note 44. The head of the appellate unit for the Los
Angeles U.S. Attorney's office offered a different perspective on the Department's decision not to
appeal Henthorn. "I don't think the Department realized just how big this decision [Henthorn] was,
or the trouble it would cause." Telephone Interview with Miriam Krinsky, Assistant U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of Califomia (Sept. 6, 1996).
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3. Life After Henthorn-Within the Ninth Circuit
a. Get Your Hands Off My Files-Or, Who Gets To Do the Dirty
Work?
The Henthorn panel did not address the question of who was
responsible for conducting the review of an agent's personnel file, a
question that plagued prosecutors and agents alike as they struggled to
interpret and follow the dictates of the decision. In the first Ninth Circuit
case after Henthorn, the government appealed from a district court's
decision to exclude the testimony of government agents unless agency
counsel and department heads first reviewed the agents' personnel files
for potential impeachment material." The appellate panel in United
States v. Dominguez-Villa held that the trial judge had exceeded his
authority by requiring agency counsel to review the personnel files and
by requiring the agency heads to "sign-off' on counsels' determination
of whether a particular file contained Brady material. 8 The three-judge
panel59 reasoned that because the district court did not have general
supervisory powers over the co-equal executive branch of the
government, it could not require the agency lawyers and department
heads to review the personnel files at issue.'
Close on the heels of Dominguez- Villa, another Ninth Circuit panel
reversed a district court's order requiring the prosecutor to review
personally the personnel files of several case agents.6' Again, a three-
judge panel62 held that the district court's order was outside the scope of
the court's supervisory power.63 The court agreed with the trial court
57. United States v. Dominguez-Villa, 954 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1992).
58. Id.
59. Judges Alfred T. Goodwin, Otto R. Skopil, Jr., and John T. Noonan, Jr. Opinion by J. Skopil.
60. Dominguez- Villa, 954 F.2d at 565.
61. United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992).
62. Judges Cecil F. Poole, Edward Leavy, and Stephen S. Trott. Opinion by J. Poole.
63. Jennings, 960 F.2d at 1491. Judge Poole wrote:
We have never held that the prosecutor's obligations under Brady, Bagley, or Giglio require the
personal effort demanded of the AUSA by the district court. To the contrary, we have previously
allowed the government to comply with obligations similar to those imposed by Brady by
submitting an affidavit by a law enforcement officer personally familiar with the relevant facts.
Id. at 1491-92. The Jennings court also underscored the presumption that the government would
comply with its Henthorn obligations, unless the defense could show otherwise. "There is no
indication that the government has not or will not comply with its duty faithfully to conduct review
of the agent's personnel files. Thus, there is no basis to presume that any illegal conduct must be
deterred." Id. at 1492.
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insofar as "the AUSA prosecuting the case is responsible for compliance
with the dictates of Brady and its progeny."' Nevertheless, the court held
that this "personal responsibility" did not authorize the district court to
use its supervisory powers to manage the manner in which the prosecutor
fulfilled his obligation to produce exculpatory evidence."
The holdings of Dominguez- Villa and Jennings left open the question
of who exactly was supposed to review the personnel files. The holding
in Dominguez-Villa made it clear that the court would not force the
agency heads to "sign-off' on the review, but the Jennings decision
seemed to take the prosecutor off the hook. Who was left?66
Before another Ninth Circuit panel could answer the question, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided (in a five-four67 decision) a case that did not
mention personnel files but that perhaps offered some guidance. In Kyles
v. Whitley, the Court reviewed a state murder conviction to determine
whether the prosecutor's unwitting failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence in the possession of the police had deprived the defendant of a
fair trial. In holding that the failure to produce several items of evidence
violated Brady,6" the Court rejected the state's argument that it should
not "be held accountable under Bagley69 and Brady for evidence known
only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor., 70
A mere tvo months after the Court's decision in Kyles, a district judge
in the Ninth Circuit, relying on Kyles, ruled that Jennings had been
effectively overruled "to the extent Jennings permits prosecutors to
delegate to the relevant federal agencies the responsibility under
Henthorn to review personnel files."' In United States v. Lacy, Judge
64. Id. at 1490.
65. Id. at 1490-91.
66. The process by which the agencies and U.S. Attorneys' offices have attempted to comply with
Henthorn and subsequent cases is discussed in greater detail in part III, infra.
67. Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995). Justice David Souter delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
Stephen Breyer joined. (Justice Stevens also filed a concurring opinion in which Ginsburg and
Breyer joined.) Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices William
Rehnquist, Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined.
68. Id. at 1558-59.
69. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) ("[I]mpeachment evidence ...as well as
exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule.").
70. Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1568.
71. United States v. Lacy, 896 F. Supp 982 (N.D. Cal. 1995), vacated by United States v. Herring,
83 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1996). The opinion was written by Judge Marilyn Hall Patel. Judge Patel is
commonly known as a liberal judge and a critic of the Justice Department. See, e.g., Howard Mintz,
A Question of Responsibility: A Federal Judge Has Ruled that Prosecutors Must Personally Review
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Marilyn Hall Patel was unimpressed with the prosecutor's assurances
that he was ultimately responsible for responding to the Henthorn
request, given his reliance on the agencies to tell him whether the files
contained anything noteworthy.72 When the government refused to
comply with Judge Patel's discovery order, she dismissed a drug
indictment against Maurice Herring, one of the defendants in the Lacy
case.73 The government appealed.
In May of 1996, the Ninth Circuit, in a per curiam cpinion, vacated
Judge Patel's order and remanded to the district court.74 The ruling was
extremely narrow. The court held only that Jennings survived Kyles as
the law of the Ninth Circuit, so that prosecutors were not compelled, at
least not by Kyles, personally to conduct a search for Brady materials in
the personnel files of testifying government agents.' The Ninth Circuit
the Personnel Files of Law Enforcement Agents who Testify in Criminal Cases. Prosecutors are
Protesting an Onerous Burden, Recorder, Sept. 5, 1995, at 1, 1 ("San Francisco U.S. District Judge
Marilyn Hall Patel is once again taking on the Justice Department's ethics guidelines with a decision
that has the U.S. attorney's [sic] office and other federal agencies up in arms.").
72. Lacy, 896 F. Supp. at 985. Judge Patel stated:
Indeed, it is readily apparent that the various agencies' Henthorn processes are something of a
bureaucratic quagmire which involve a variety of people preparing "summaries" that bounce
back and forth between supervisors, attorneys, and clerks, all before anything even reaches the
desk of the AUSA who, everyone agrees, is "ultimately responsible." How an AUSA can, in
good faith and as an officer of the court, accept such responsibility for work performed entirely
by others not even under his or her control is somewhat of a mystery.
Id. (footnote omitted).
73. Transcript of Proceedings at 15, United States v. Herring (N.D. Cal. 1995) (No. CR-94-0384-
MHP), reprinted in Excerpt of Record at 265, United States v. Herring, 83 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1996)
(No. 95-10521).
74. Herring, 83 F.3d 1120 (Judges Harry Pregerson, William A. Norris, and Stephen Reinhardt).
As one legal commentator wrote, "[there are some things even the most liberal Ninth Circuit U.S.
Court of Appeals panel will refuse to do." Howard Mintz, Patel Reversed on Prosecutors'Discovery
Burden; They Need Not to [sic] Review Files Personally, Appeals Court Says, Recorder, May 14,
1996, at 1, 1.
75. The court noted:
The question we must decide is whether Jennings was effectively overruled by Kyles. We
hold that it was not principally because Kyles did not address the question presented by Jennings
and this case-whether the district court has the authority to issue a pre-tri,1 order requiring a
prosecutor to review personnel files of testifying officers personally. Rather. Kyles was a post-
conviction case involving the application of the well-established Brady rule that the
prosecution's failure to disclose Brady material justifies a new trial, regardless of whether that
failure "is in good faith or bad faith."
Herring, 83 F.3d at 1121 (citing Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1567). Nevertheless, regardless of whether a
trial court has the authority to issue a pre-trial order requiring a prosecutor to review a file
personally, a prosecutor who wishes to avoid a post-conviction reversal for failure to have
undertaken such a review would be prudent to review the file personally, given the language of
Kyles.
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panel distinguished Kyles-where Brady compliance was assessed from
a post-conviction perspective-from Herring/Lacy, where Henthorn
compliance was reviewed on appeal even before the case went to trial.76
Although Kyles certainly reiterated (and arguably expanded) the
prosecutor's Brady duty as viewed from the post-conviction perspective,
the Herring panel wrote that the U.S. Supreme Court's language
provided "no guidance for deciding whether a district court may issue
pre-trial discovery orders requiring prosecutors to review personnel files
personally.
77
Although the Department of Justice viewed Herring as a victory,7 8 the
decision leaves open the question of what method of reviewing files
federal prosecutors should rely upon to pass muster in the Ninth
Circuit.79 In effect, the law enforcement community was left with
precious little guidance on how to comply with the general principles of
Henthorn.8" The Herring decision may let the prosecutor close her eyes
to a review of the files in the hope that there are no surprises post-
conviction, but it also leaves the prosecutor dependent on an agency to
perform the review. If the agency review is later found to have been
deficient, it is the prosecutor who is faced with a retrial.
The uncertainty of Ninth Circuit law on who should review personnel
files was underscored further in a case that did not even deal specifically
with personnel files."1 Citing Kyles, the panel in United States v. Alvarez
reluctantly affirmed the district court's denial of a discovery motion for a
testifying police officer's rough notes, but reprimanded the government
76. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that "[t]here is no general constitutional right to
discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one." Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545,
559 (1977).
77. Herring, 83 F.3d at 1122.
78. Telephone Interview with Patty Merkamp Stemler, Attorney, Department of Justice (June 18,
1996). Stemler wrote the appellant's brief and argued on behalf of the government in Herring.
79. "[W]e express no opinion as to whether the method by which the AUSA proposes to locate
and identify Brady material in this particular case satisfies the requirements of Henthorn." Herring,
83 F.3d at 1123.
80. Interview with Andrew R. Hamilton, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Western District of
Washington, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 15, 1996) ("I just wish they [the court] would give us some
guidance on how we're supposed to live with this thing [Henthorn].").
81. United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1996) (opinion written by Judge Betty B.
Fletcher). Appellant Alvarez was indicted on federal drug charges. The government turned over to
the defense surveillance reports prepared by investigating officers expected to testify at trial. The
district court denied a pre-trial order for discovery of"rough notes" after the government represented
that a police department investigator had reviewed the officers' rough notes and found no
discrepancies. Id. at 903-04.
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for delegating the inspection of the notes to the police agency. 2 The
language, if not the holding, of Alvarez makes it unclear whether Herring
will remain the law of the Ninth Circuit.
Prosecutors in the Ninth Circuit are left, then, with an uneasy balance.
On the one hand, Herring remains the law of the Circuit, absolving
prosecutors of the responsibility to review files personally. On the other
hand, if, under Kyles, the prosecutor is ultimately responsible for Brady
violations regardless whether they were made in good faith reliance on
an agency's review, the cautious prosecutor should be actively engaged
in the review of the file.
b. How Far Does Henthom Reach?
When Henthorn was decided, lawyers at the Department of Justice
assumed that its purview did not extend to the personnel files of local or
state law enforcement officers working on task forces with federal
agents." That assumption was validated in 1992, with the Dominguez-
Villa decision,' when the Ninth Circuit agreed with the government's
contention that the district court had exceeded its authority by requiring
review of personnel files of state law enforcement witnesses.85 In 1994, a
circuit panel specifically avoided an opportunity to revisit this issue by
finding that the testimony of the witness in question had not affected the
82. The court indicated that:
Delegating the responsibility to a nonattomey police investigator to review his own and other
officers' rough notes to determine whether they contain Brady, Bagley, and Giglio information
is clearly problematic. Although we have held that the district court cannot order an AUSA
personally to review law enforcement personnel files, United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488
(9th Cir. 1992); accord United States v. Herring, Nos. 95-10521, 95-10541, slip op. 5733 (9th
Cir. May 13, 1996) (holding that Jennings survives Kyles as the law of the circuit), we see little
justification and much danger to both the prosecutor's reputation and the quality ofjustice her
office serves for a prosecutor not to review personally those materials directly related to the
investigation and prosecution of the defendants, such as a testifying officer's surveillance notes.
Alvarez, 86 F.3d at 905.
Compare Alvarez with Rivers v. Borg, No. 92-15360, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32193, at *1 (9th
Cir. Nov. 4, 1992), where the circuit court upheld the district court's denial of the defendant's
discovery request for the police investigative logs of the two officers who investigated him.
Effectively creating a materiality standard for discovery of police logs, the Rivers court said that the
"mere possibility" that a piece of undisclosed information might have helped the defense does not
establish an obligation upon the government to turn the information over to the defense. Rivers, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 32193, at *3 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976)).
83. Memorandum from Mueller, supra note 5.
84. United States v. Dominguez-Villa, 954 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1992).
85. Id. at 566 ("The prosecution is under no obligation to turn over materials not under its
control.") (quoting United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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outcome of the case.86 And recently, a Ninth Circuit panel declined to
extend the reach of Henthorn to the personnel files of officers of a police
department on an Indian Reservation."
But many defense lawyers and prosecutors believe that Ninth Circuit
panels have limited Henthorn arbitrarily by distinguishing between
federal agents and all other law enforcement officers." As one federal
prosecutor put it, commenting on the cases following Henthorn: "What
are we going to do, not hand over impeachment evidence on a state cop
who's worked on a federal task force for months? We'd end up with egg
all over our face in front of the Ninth Circuit."89
The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the question when, if ever, the
entries in an agent's personnel file are simply too remote to be relevant at
trial. By contrast, the California State Legislature has enacted a
procedure in the California Evidence Code that allows the defense to
gain access to complaints of misconduct in police personnel records but
bars access to complaints concerning conduct "occurring more than five
years before the event or transaction which is the subject of the
litigation."9 The Ninth Circuit could elect to adopt some version of a
presumptive limitations cut-off on personnel file entries deemed too
remote to be relevant, leaving the trial court to make judgment calls
86. United States v. Escobar, C.A. Nos. 93-10690, 94-10027, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 30665, at *2
(9th Cir. Oct. 31, 1994). There is confusion among prosecutors trying to comply with the spirit of
Henthorn. Do testifying officers include Internal Revenue Service auditors or bookkeepers, for
example? These witnesses are federal employees, but are not generally considered to be law
enforcement officers.
87. United States v. Parrish, No. 95-10035, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 10232, at *1, *6-*7 (9th Cir.
Apr. 17, 1996). See also United States v. Lawrence, CR No. 94-155-FR, 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS
16893, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 15, 1994) where the defendant requested the personnel file of a Deputy
District Attorney working on a joint federal-local task force. The district court reviewed the files in
camera and found that they contained no information that would be material to the defendant's case.
The case raises the spectre of discovery requests for the personnel files of federal prosecutors
themselves. It is not difficult to imagine such a request--especially for a prosecutor who has been
known to suppress Brady material in the past.
88. Telephone Interview with Mark Bartlett, Assistant U.S. Attorney and Supervisor, General
Crimes Unit, for the Western District of Washington (Aug. 14, 1996); Interview with C. James
Frush, supra note 32; Interview with Thomas IV. Hillier, II, Federal Public Defender, Western
District of Washington, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 15, 1996); Telephone Interview with Leidman, supra
note 5 1.
89. Telephone Interview with Mark Bartlett, supra note 88.
90. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1043, 1045 (1995). For a discussion of the law on disclosure of police
personnel files in California, see Gerald F. Uelmen, Lessons From the Trial: The People v. O.J.
Simpson 128-34 (1996).
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weighing the relevance of the requested discovery against its prejudicial
value. This could limit the potential reach of Henthorn.9'
c. When Will a Prosecutor's Failure To Inspect an Agent's Personnel
File After a Henthorn Request Warrant Reversal on Appeal and a
New Trial?
Several Ninth Circuit decisions have made clear that the government's
failure to inspect an agent's file does not warrant a new trial if the error
was harmless. In making the harmless error analysis, these courts have
focused on whether the verdict would have been affected by any doubts
that might have been cast upon the agent's credibility by the contents of
his personnel file. For example, in a 1994 case, a Ninth Circuit panel,
applying the materiality test of Brady, held that the district court had
committed harmless error when it denied the defendant access to certain
records in a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) agent's
personnel file.92 "Any doubt cast on his [the ATF agent's] credibility
would not have affected the verdict."'93 The decision underscored that the
courts, in assessing materiality, would necessarily look at whether
impeachment of the testifying agent would have mattered to the jury in
reaching its verdict.94
91. Such an approach is paralleled in the Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically, Rule 609(b):
Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime:
Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than
ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the
confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by
specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Fed. R Evid. 609(b).
92. United States v. Calise, 996 F.2d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 1994).
93. Id. at 1022. One of the records submitted by the government and inspected in camera by the
court showed that in a previous case a federal magistrate had characterized the agent's testimony as
"absolutely incredible." Id. at 1021. The government obtained a written statement from the
magistrate explaining his earlier conclusion: "[tihat phrase ['absolutely incredible'] was not what I
intended and not what I meant, and I was wrong to use such terminology." Id. at 1021.
The test of materiality was defined more recently in Kyles as whether there is a "reasonable
probability" that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the verdict would have been
different. Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995); Cynthia L. Corcoran, Note, Prosecutors Must
Disclose Exculpatory Information When the Net Effect of the Suppressed Evidence Makes It
Reasonably Probable that Disclosure Would Have Produced a Different Resvlt, 26 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 832 (1996).
94. See also United States v. Cocoa-Tapia, Nos. 93-10211, 93-10212, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
17154, at *1 (9th Cir. July 11, 1994). After an in camera review of the personnel files of testifying
witnesses, the Ninth Circuit panel said "[W]e have reviewed the documents and the in camera
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4. Life After Henthom-Outside the Ninth Circuit
Outside the Ninth Circuit, every federal court that has considered
whether to adopt the Henthorn rule has declined to do so, rejecting the
idea that the government is obligated to review the personnel files of
testifying federal law enforcement officers merely upon a request by the
defendant. These courts have weighed the Henthorn standard
(defendant's request triggers review) against a standard tougher on
defendants-requiring the defense to make a prior showing that the file
will yield information that is material to the defendant's case before the
government's obligation to look will be triggered. These courts have
been concerned that defendants will engage in needless "fishing
expeditions" that will cost the courts and the government time and
money without advancing any legitimate or constitutional benefit. But
the ramifications of a standard too strict for defendants are equally
obvious: defendants will not find what prosecutors are not required to
seek.
The next section of this Article analyzes the cases outside the Ninth
Circuit and discusses how courts in other circuits have dealt with
defendants' attempts to persuade them to adopt the Ninth Circuit's
approach in Henthorn. In so doing, the Article shows the split between
the Ninth Circuit and the other circuits over whether the defendant must
make a prior showing that an agent's file will yield something
exculpatory or of impeachment value before the government will be
required to inspect it.
proceedings. The personnel files contain no information that would be material to appellant's case."
Id. at *9.
These appeals-and the determination of whether a Henthorn error was harmless or not-can take
a long time. In one case, a panel of the Ninth Circuit found in 1992 that the required Henthorn
examination had not been accomplished with regard to two federal agents. United States v.
Montalvo, No. 90-10078, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18863, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 1992). The circuit
court remanded to the district court to conduct an in camera review of the relevant files to determine
whether the failure to examine the records was harmless error. Nearly four years later, the Court of
Appeals ruled (in an unpublished opinion) that the district court had properly determined that the
government's failure to examine the files was harmless. United States v. Montalvo, Nos. 94-10108,
94-10110, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 561, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 1996).
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a. The Requirement of a Prior Showing ofMateriality
1) Appellate Decisions
The decisions from the Sixth Circuit are the strongest against the
Henthorn rule and most in favor of making a defendant show that an
agent's personnel file will yield something of material impeachment
value before requiring the government to review the file. In 1992, a Sixth
Circuit panel expressly rejected the Henthorn rule.95 In affirming the
district court's decision denying the defendant's motion for discovery of
several police officers' personnel files for impeachment purposes, the
Sixth Circuit panel in United States v. Driscoll held the defendant to a
tougher standard than that enunciated in Henthorn: "Mr. Driscoll offered
no support for his contention that personnel files might contain
information important to his case."96 The court cited the Seventh
Circuit's pre-Henthorn decisions in United States v. Andrus9 7 and United
States v. Navarro" for the proposition that mere speculation is not
enough to trigger the government's obligation to inspect, or the court's
obligation to review personnel files of testifying officers.99
95. United States v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472 (6th Cir. 1992). Ronald Driscoll was charged by
indictment with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and wth possession of an
unregistered firearm. At trial, he moved for disclosure and inspection of several police officers'
personnel files, arguing that he needed this information to attack their credibility. The district court
denied the motion. Driscoll appealed his conviction, claiming that the district court's denial of his
motion for disclosure of the files violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Driscoll, 970 F.2d
at 1472.
96. Driscoll, 970 F.2d at 1472.
97. 775 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1985).
98. 737 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1984).
99. See, however, Judge Nathaniel R. Jones' dissent in Driscoll:
If the arresting officers' personnel files contained evidence that would cast doubt on their
credibility, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Driscoll's trial might have been
different. I am also convinced that Driscoll was at an unfair disadvantage, in that the prosecution
emphasized the officers' credibility, and Driscoll was unable to rebut these remarks. Therefore,
to balance the importance of a defendant's due process rights against the recognition that a
defendant does not have a right to unlimited discovery, I would again follow the lead of the
Ninth Circuit. In a case on all fours with the instant case, United States v. Ienthom, the Ninth
Circuit held that a defendant seeking Brady materialsfor impeachment purposes is not required
to make an initial showing of materiality to have his case remanded for an in camera inspection
of the materials in question. The Henthorn holding is contrary to the Seventh Circuit's decision
in United States v. Andrus upon which the majority relies. I believe the Henthorn approach more
evenly balances the opposing concerns involved. Therefore, I would remand this case to the
district court for an in camera inspection of the officers' personnel files ....
Driscoll, 970 F.2d at 1489 (Jones, J., dissenting).
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Three years later, another Sixth Circuit panel reaffirmed the standard
set in Driscoll.1"a Once again, the court held that "mere speculation that a
government file may contain Brady material was not sufficient to require
a remand for in camera inspection."''l The defendant had made the
request at the district court level, but, according to the appellate court,
had not substantiated his claim with any evidence to support his
contention.0 2 Citing Driscoll and Andrus, the court affirmed the district
court's denial of the defendant's discovery request.
The District of Columbia Circuit unequivocally adopted the same
standard as the Sixth Circuit in holding that the defendant must make
some prior showing in order to trigger the government's obligation to
review law enforcement personnel files." 3 In doing so, the court
expressed its concern for the efficiency of the system. The panel affirmed
the district court's denial of discovery, noting, "Were we to grant the
relief sought in this case on this basis, the potential for mischief would be
boundless."'"
2) Federal District Court and State Court Decisions Since Henthorn
Outside of the Ninth Circuit, no federal district court or state court that
has specifically considered whether to adopt the Henthorn standard (that
is, no materiality showing is required to trigger the government's
obligation to review personnel files) has done so. Federal district courts
have consistently rejected the Henthorn standard, finding that the burden
placed on the prosecution to review the files is high, while the likelihood
100. United States v. Valentine, No. 94-6195, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16584, at *1 (6th Cir. June
30, 1995). Defendant Valentine appealed from his conviction on various counterfeiting charges. On
appeal, Valentine contended that the district court erred by requiring him to make an initial showing
that the personnel records were "material" before ordering the government to produce the records.
101. Id. at *12-*13 (citing Driscoll, 970 F.2d at 1482).
102. Id.
103. See United States v. Lafayette, 983 F.2d 1102, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
104. Id.; see also United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Pou, 953
F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 1992) ("A due process standard which is satisfied by mere speculation would
convert Brady into a discovery device and impose an undue burden upon the district court.")
(quoting United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 1984)). Leung did not involve
personnel files, but rather files of government informants. In affirming the trial court's refusal to
order pre-trial discovery of the files, the Second Circuit panel said, "[i]n the rare circumstances
where such [in camera] inspection is required, its purpose is not to provide a general discovery
device for the defense; criminal defendants have no constitutional right to know the contents of
Government files in order to present arguments in favor of disclosure." Leung, 40 F.3d at 583.
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of finding exculpatory evidence is extremely low.' Some have denied
personnel file requests out of hand because the defendant did not make a
credible showing that the information contained in the files was material
to his defense." 6
Some state courts have considered the accused's right to discovery of
personnel records or grievance histories of state or local officers, but
only two of these cases have expressly framed the issue as a choice
between the federal standards of Henthorn and Driscoll."7 In an Arizona
case, the Arizona Court of Appeals squarely refused to adopt the
105. United States v. Preston, No. 95-40083-01-SAC, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6712, at *1, *45 (D.
Kan. Apr. 5, 1996) ("The court further finds that the defendant's request, as presented, amounts to a
'broad and blind fishing expedition."'). For other federal district court decisions from Kansas that
reaffirm the defendant's obligation to meet a materiality threshold, see United States v. Hill, 799 F.
Supp. 86 (D. Kan. 1992); United States v. Sumner, 793 F. Supp. 273 (D. Kan 1992); United States v.
Nicholson, Crim. Action No. 91-10027-02, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19825, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 5,
1991); United States v. Conner, Crim. Action No. 91-10028, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17566, at *1,
*15 (D. Kan. Nov. 6, 1991) (stating that "defendants are not entitled to the personnel files of law
enforcement witnesses without some indication that impeaching material may be contained
therein"); United States v. Davis, Crim. Action No. 91-10027-01, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8069, at *1
(D. Kan. June 6, 1991).
106. In Pennsylvania: see, e.g., United States v. Chapple, Crim. No. 91-111, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19977, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 1991) (denying defendant's motion for personnel files).
In Illinois: see, e.g., United States v. Zeglen, No. 93 CR 862, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14743, at *I
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 1994); United States v. Infelise, No. 90 CR 87-12, 18, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10284, at *1 (N.D. 11. July 25, 1991); United States v. Salerno, 796 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. II1. 1991);
United States v. Quintanilla, 760 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
In New York: see, e.g., United States v. Escobar, 842 F. Supp. 1519, 1530 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The
defendant has made no showing, indeed, he does not even allege that any of the personnel files of the
testifying agent-witnesses contain impeachment materials."); United States v. Morales, No. 93 Cr.
291 (KC), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15889, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1993). In Morales the government
agreed to examine the relevant personnel files for exculpatory information, even though the court
had noted that the defendant "offers neither a legal basis for this motion nor a specific reason for the
particular request." Id. at *48. The court called the government's response and willingness to inspect
the files "appropriate." Therefore, it did not need to reach the specific issue whether to require a
materiality showing. Id.
In New Jersey: see, e.g., United States v. Bertoli, 854 F. Supp. 975 (D.N.J.). af/'d, 40 F.3d 1384
(3d Cir. 1994), where the district court considered both the standard of the Sixth Circuit (Driscoll)
and the standard of the Ninth Circuit (Henthorn) before finding that the defendant failed under either
standard because his request for personnel files was "overly broad in that it failed to identify either
specific witnesses or specific exculpatory or impeachment evidence which [the defendant] believed
would be contained in those files." Id. at 1041. Although the court may not have specifically adopted
either standard, the language of the decision certainly suggests that the court required the defendant
to make some showing of materiality before it would grant a discovery request for personnel files.
107. The state cases-other than the two that discuss the competing federal approaches of the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits-are beyond the purview of this Article.
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Henthorn approach, and sided with the Sixth Circuit.' 8 In a Delaware
case, the Supreme Court of Delaware followed the Arizona Court.0 9
b. How Can a Defendant Meet the "Showing of Materiality"
Requirement?
Of the circuit courts that have declined to follow the Ninth Circuit's
Henthorn rule, none has addressed a key issue: how can a defendant
support a showing of materiality without first knowing what is in the
personnel file he seeks? This section will highlight the few cases that
have offered any indication of how high a hurdle a defendant must jump
in order to make a sufficient showing of materiality.
In one such case, a Second Circuit panel found that the district court
had erred in refusing to compel production of an FBI agent's personnel
file for an in camera inspection, even after the prosecutor had informed
the court in camera that the agent's file contained complaints against
him-including an allegation that he was "on the take."".. The jury's
verdict turned on the credibility of this particular witness, and the
prosecutor had argued in summation that the agent was credible because
of his long service to the FBI."'
Perhaps the only other case to put some meat on the bones of the
materiality requirement was a district court decision in the Second
Circuit, in which the court ordered the government to submit the
personnel file of an FBI agent for an in camera inspection after the
defendant proffered that the agent was known to have "a particular
reason" to want the defendant convicted, "based on a personal
108. State v. Robles, 895 P.2d 1031 (Ariz. Ct. App.), review denied, 908 P.2d 483 (Ariz. 1995).
"Although we have found no Arizona authority directly on point, we decline appellant's invitation to
adopt Henthorn. Rather, we adopt the threshold materiality showing required in United States v.
Driscoll." Id. at 1035. The Arizona Court offered no reason why it chose Driscoll over Henthorn.
109. Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d 1017, 1023 (Del. 1996). The court stated:
There is a divergence of opinion with regard to when a defendant will be entitled to an in
camera judicial review of police personnel files for general impeachment purposes. The majority
view requires a determination that the defendant has established a factual basis for the requested
files before ordering an in camera inspection.
Id.
110. United States v. Kiszewski, 877 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1989). The prosecutor said that the agent's
file contained complaints against him, one to the effect that the agent was "on the take," and another
for appearing as a witness without the FBI's permission. The prosecutor reported that the FBI had
exonerated the agent on the first complaint, and had issued a letter of reprimand after investigating
the second. Id at 215.
111. Id.
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animosity."' 12 The court ruled for the defendant, citing the "somewhat
unique posture of this case vis 6 vis the relationship" between the
defendant and the agent."'
5. A Summary of Where the Federal Prosecutor and Defense Lawyer
Stand Today
a. Inside the Ninth Circuit
Since 1984'14 and as recently as May, 1996,"' courts in the Ninth
Circuit have established that upon a request by a defendant in a criminal
case for pre-trial discovery of the personnel file of a federal agent who
will testify at trial, the government must examine the file for evidence
that could be used to impeach the agent's credibility." 6 The review of the
file need not be made by the prosecutor personally. It can be made by
officials of the agency-employer of the agent-witness." 7 Those officials
must report the results of their review of the file to the prosecutor, who is
ultimately responsible for complying with Brady and Giglio."8
If the prosecutor, or agency, finds no impeachment material, the
prosecutor has no duty to disclose to the defense or the court any
information in the agent's personnel file."9 If, however, the examination
does produce material that could be used to impeach the agent, the
prosecutor must turn that material over to the defense. 21 If the
examination reveals information of questionable impeachment value,
then the prosecutor must turn the questionable portions of the file over to
the court for an in camera review, and thus allow the court to determine
whether the information must be turned over to the defense.' 2 ' To date,
the Henthorn obligation has been applied only to the personnel files of
112. United States v. Leonard, 817 F. Supp. 286, 302 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). The agent's testimony and
his written reports were critical to the government's case.
113. Id.
114. See United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1984).
115. See United States v. Herring, 83 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1996).
116. United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991).
117. Herring, 83 F.3d at 1122 n.3; United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488, 1491 (9th Cir.
1992).
118. Herring, 83 F.3d at 1122.
119. Henthorn, 931 F.2d at 31.
120. Id. at 30-31; United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1467-68 (9th Cir. 1984).
121. Henthorn, 931 F.2d at 3 1; Cadet, 727 F.2d at 1467-68.
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federal law enforcement agents, not to those of state or local agents
working on federal task forces, even if they are to testify at trial."'
The government's obligation to review the personnel files of testifying
agents is triggered by the defense attorney's request alone. The defense is
not required to make any prior showing of materiality-that is, the
defense is not required to make a showing that the personnel files
actually contain information that could be used to impeach the credibility
of the agent on the stand. Should the government fail to make such an
inspection prior to conviction, the appellate court will determine whether
the failure nevertheless constituted harmless error."2 In making its
analysis, the court will look to the significance of the particular agent's
testimony and to whether impeachment of the witness would have
affected the verdict.
1 24
b. Outside the Ninth Circuit
The Henthorn line of cases has not been accepted outside of the Ninth
Circuit. Several circuit courts and district courts have expressly refused
to adopt Henthorn, holding instead that the defendant must make some
showing of materiality before triggering the government's obligation to
search the personnel files for Brady or Giglio information. Still other
circuit, district, and state courts have held the defendant to the same
materiality standard, although they have not always made specific
mention of Henthorn when rejecting its approach."2 The result has been
consistent denials of defendants' requests for personnel files except in
the very few cases where a defendant made a credible showing that
particular information probably lay within a particular file.'26
A plaguing question remains: assuming that prosecutors in all the
circuits have the same constitutional and ethical obligations under Brady
and Giglio to turn over evidence that is either exculpatory or can be used
to impeach government witnesses, how can it be that one circuit triggers
the government's obligation to look for that evidence upon a simple
122. United States v. Dominguez-Villa, 954 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1992).
123. United States v. Calise, 996 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cocoa-Tapia, Nos.
93-1021 1, 93-10212, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 17154, at *1 (9th Cir. July 11, 1994).
124. United States v. Escobar, C.A. Nos. 93-10690, 94-10027, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 30665, at
*1 (9th Cir. Oct. 31, 1994); Cocoa-Tapia, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 17154, at *1.
125. See supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
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request by the defendant while others put the burden on the defendant to
find it and then ask the government to produce it?
6. Resolving the Split: The U.S. Supreme Court and a Look at the
Future
In Kyles v. Whitley, 27 a decision in which personnel files are not even
mentioned, the U.S. Supreme Court has perhaps given us some idea of
the direction it could take if and when the split between the circuits on
the personnel files issue is brought before it. In a five-four' decision,
the Court in Kyles ruled that prosecutors have a broad mandate to
discover exculpatory evidence that may exist outside of their own case
files.'29 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, said that the prosecution
has an ongoing, cumulative duty to learn of "any favorable evidence
known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including
the police."'3 °
127. 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995).
128. See supra note 67.
129. One commentator has noted:
Kyles has put to rest any notion that the prosecution is only accountable for the facts known. The
prosecutor's obligations include the duty to ferret out "favorable evidence known to others,
acting on [her] behalf in the case, including the police." The Supreme Court, in Kyles, rejected
the State of Louisiana's request "to substitute the police for the prosecutor, and even the courts
themselves, as the final arbiters of the government's obligation to ensure fair trials." The
Supreme Court's confidence that prosecutors will play fair is the most important component of
the Brady line of cases.
John C. Lambrose, Discovery in the Wake of Kyles: Don't Tack Too Close to the Wind, Nev. Law.,
Nov. 1995, at 10, 11 (citations omitted).
Kyles is discussed in part II, supra, in the context of United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488 (9th
Cir. 1992) and United States v. Herring, 83 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1996). This section looks more
broadly at the language of Kyles to see not whether Kyles overruled Jennings with respect to who is
responsible for conducting the personnel file review, but rather for insight into how the Supreme
Court might rule if presented with the issue of when and how the government's duty to inspect those
files is triggered.
130. Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1567. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder by a Louisiana
jury and sentenced to death. After the conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, state
collateral review showed that the State had never disclosed evidence favorable to the defendant. This
evidence included: (1) eyewitness statements taken by the police following the murder, (2) various
statements made to the police by an informant who was never called to testify; and (3) a computer
print-out of license numbers of cars parked at the crime scene on the night of the murder (the list did
not include the defendant's car). Because the net effect of the state-suppressed evidence favoring the
defendant raised a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have produced a different result at
trial, the conviction was reversed and the defendant was entitled to a new trial. For a full discussion
of Kyles, see Corcoran, supra note 93.
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Reading Kyles broadly as applied to personnel files, it follows that the
prosecutor has an ongoing obligation to learn of exculpatory or
impeachment evidence in personnel files of government agents, and that
this obligation should not depend on a request by the defendant. And,
although Justice Souter's opinion did emphasize that evidence is not
material (and hence need not be turned over to the defense) unless there
is a "reasonable probability" that its disclosure would have produced a
different result, the opinion can also be read to suggest that the
prosecutor's obligation to look for exculpatory and impeachment
information in government files is not dependent upon a prior showing of
materiality by the defendant.131
III. THE PROCESS
Part III of this Article describes the procedures that the Department of
Justice and the various federal law enforcement agencies have designed
for reviewing their agents' personnel files when obligated to look for
impeachment material.
Part III first addresses the official compliance process as it has been
developed by the Department of Justice and the federal law enforcement
agencies. After a review of the official compliance process, the Article
then looks behind the scenes and explores the unofficial dissatisfaction
with the ways in which the government has responded to requests to
review files, from the perspectives of the federal agencies, the federal
prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Part III shows that, in the Ninth
131. Kyles, 115 S. Ct. 1555. One commentator writing on Kyles has suggested that Kyles should
not be taken as a sign that the Supreme Court might be inclined to embrace Henthorn. See Stephen
P. Jones, Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 25 U. Mem.
L. Rev. 735 (1994). The commentator focuses on a 1987 case, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39
(1987), in which the Court ruled that a defendant did not have an unfettered right to review
confidential Children's and Youth Services records. The Court's refusal to grant the defendant
automatic access to the records upon request was, in Jones' view, at odds with Henthorn, where it
was held that the defendant's request for the personnel file was enough to trigger the government's
review of the file. But Henthorn and Ritchie are not at odds. Henthorn does not give a defendant
unfettered or automatic access to sensitive records upon request-the problem that bothered the
Court in Ritchie. Under Henthorn, a defendant's request for a personnel file simply triggers the
government's obligation to review the file for Brady or Giglio material. If there is no such material
to be found, the file will not be turned over. If the prosecutor is not certain whether information in
the file is materially significant enough to disclose, she must submit the file to the trial judge for an
in camera determination. That procedure is not in conflict with anything the Court said in Ritchie. On
the contrary, the Ritchie court endorsed that very same procedure, holding that, while the defendant
did not have a right to unfettered review of the Children's and Youth Services records upon request,
he did have a right to have the records reviewed by the trial judge to determine whether they
contained information that might affect the verdict.
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Circuit, the Henthorn decision has led to some unintended consequences
and has created a triad of new tensions between prosecutors, agents, and
defense lawyers.
A. The "Official" Procedures for Reviewing Personnel Files
As was mentioned earlier, the Justice Department's first reaction to
the Henthorn decision was a memorandum circulated fiom Robert S.
Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, to the ninety-
four U.S. Attorney's Offices across the country.12 The memorandum
offered some, though not much, guidance on how to respond to so-called
Henthorn requests. Principally, the memorandum advised prosecutors to
work with the agencies to facilitate timely responses to Henthorn
requests. The memorandum passed along to prosecutors a suggestion
from the federal agencies on how Henthorn requests could be expedited:
Reviewing personnel files is a cumbersome task yet it must be
completed quickly. To facilitate the process, the agencies have
made several suggestions. First, they ask that you attempt to
negotiate with defense counsel regarding the number of files that
must be searched. For instance, try to get defense counsel to agree
to dispense with a search of the personnel files of chain-of-custody
witnesses and to settle for a search of the files of those agents
whose credibility will actually be contested at trial.'33
To date, the agencies' suggestion of winnowing the number of files
for review to the files of agents whose credibility will be an issue at trial
remains just a suggestion. Defense attorneys are not compelled by case
law, rule, or statute to acquiesce in the government's request that a
Henthorn review be limited.
In the five years since that memorandum was circulated, the
Department of Justice and the various federal law enforcement agencies
have developed and refined their protocols for reviewing personnel files.
These protocols apply not just in the Ninth Circuit, but nationwide,
governing the way the agencies review files for Brady or Giglio material
whenever such a review is required. The various protocols have not been
developed uniformly, and the Department and the agencies have debated
fiercely what the law requires of them. This debate will be described
below. Publicly, however, the Department and the agencies have
132. Memorandum from Mueller, supra note 5.
133. Id.
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suggested that their procedures for reviewing files are consistent with
each other and with the law.
In the government's appellate brief in Herring, Department of Justice
lawyers summarized the procedure by which U.S. Attorney's offices
nationwide have reviewed personnel files for impeachment material:
Under this system, the prosecutor initiates the search, he can define
the scope of the search by providing information about the charges
or the issues that are likely to be raised at trial, he can demand to
see additional documents if he is not satisfied with the information
that the agency provides, and he alone determines what information
to disclose. The agencies perform the labor of culling through
various files to identify the pool of potential impeachment
evidence. In this capacity, the agencies assist the prosecutor but
they do not substitute for him. The agencies have taken their role
seriously. Each agency has designated particular attorneys and staff
members to conduct the reviews, and they have instructed those
individuals to be liberal in their identification of potentially
relevant information.'34
Although the government's description of this process implied a uniform
and consistent approach by the various agencies, the government filed
with its brief in Herring several declarations from agency officials
revealing differences in the agencies' protocols for reviewing files. In
some of these agencies, for example, the initial task of searching for
Brady' or Giglio material was delegated to agency lawyers. In others, it
was delegated to lay employees.
According to the declaration submitted on behalf of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), upon receipt of an Assistant U.S.
Attorney's written request for a Henthorn review, the request is
processed by the Discovery Processing Staff of the Office of the Chief
Counsel.'35 That staff reviews the investigative and personnel files
maintained by the DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility and the
Office of Personnel. The Discovery Processing Staff gathers and
summarizes any information that relates to allegations of misconduct,
and forwards that information to a DEA attorney for review. The file is
134. Brief for the United States at 24-25, United States v. Herring, 83 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1996)
(No. 95-10521).
135. Declaration of Robert T. Richardson, Deputy Chief Counsel, Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), United States v. Lacy, 896 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (No. CR-94-0384-
MIHP), reprinted in Excerpt of Record at 140 exh. A, Herring (No. 95-10521), referred to in Brief
for the United States at 6, Herring (No. 95-10521).
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reviewed again by the Chief of the Domestic Criminal Law Section and
then by the Deputy Chief Counsel, who discloses to the prosecutor "all
evidence contained in [DEA] files arguably meeting [the Brady or
Giglio] standard[s], even if in [the opinion of the DEA] it does not."'36
According to the declaration, the DEA will forward additional
documents to the prosecutor upon request. The prosecutor can then
determine whether the material should be disclosed, either to the court or
the defense. If the DEA search produces no potential Brady or Giglio
material, the Deputy Chief Counsel notifies the prosecutor by letter.3
7
A personnel file review at the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) requires the effort of "at least six employees."' 38 Each
request is forwarded to the relevant department within the agency (for
example, Border Patrol or Immigration Inspector), where a management
official searches four categories of files: the agent's Official Personnel
File, Labor Management Relations Files, Office of the Inspector General
files, and files maintained by the Office of Internal Audit. 39 An INS
management official (not necessarily a lawyer) prepares a record of "any
allegations of wrongdoing or the results of any disciplinary investigation
pertaining to the agent's conduct," and discloses "any allegation of an
adverse nature to the AUSA."'4 ° The management officials who review
the files are told that "they are to record any negative information, no
matter how minor and no matter how remote."'' The decision whether to
disclose the information is then left to the prosecutor.
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms conducts a Henthorn
search of "official personnel files, incident reports and integrity
investigations conducted by the Office of Internal Affairs, and records
involving any personnel actions maintained by the Personnel
Division."'42 The staff assistant who performs the review advises the
prosecutor of "information that even arguably could be considered
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Declaration of William B. Odencrantz, Western Regional Counsel for the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), Lacy (No. CR-94-0384-MH-IP), reprinted in Excerpt of Record at 145
exh. B, Herring (No. 95-10521), referred to in Brief for the United States at 7, Herring (No. 95-
10521).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Declaration of Richard Isen, Staff Assistant to the Chief Counsel, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Lacy (No. CR-94-0384-MHP), reprinted in Excerpt of Record at 155
exh. C, Herring (No. 95-10521), referred to in Brief for the United States at 7, Herring (No. 95-
10521).
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evidence that is required to be disclosed under any applicable court order
or legal criteria, such as those set forth in Brady v. Maryland or Giglio v.
United States.'
143
At the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), an attorney reviews the
personnel files of its employee witnesses for "any evidence of untruthful
or perjurious conduct," or other evidence that may be relevant to the
charges in question, such as past incidents of excessive force in an
assault case.'" The IRS attorneys are instructed to be "candid in
disclosing any negative information to prosecutors" because "the
prosecutor must ultimately decide whether to disclose the information to
the court or defense counsel." 4 ' The IRS searches through four
categories of files'46 for Brady or Giglio material before providing the
prosecutor with copies of the relevant information. 141
At the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the review of an agent's
personnel file is supervised by an FBI attorney in the agent's field office.
The attorney searches the file for "any information that is or may be
exculpatory or impeachment material."'48 The FBI counsel sends the
143. Id. (citations omitted).
144. Declaration of Paul J. Krug, Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), Lacy (No. CR-94-0384-MHP), reprinted in Excerpt of Record at 159 exh. D, Herring (No.
95-10521), referred to in Brief for the United States at 7-8, Herring (No. 95-10521) [hereinafter
Krug Declaration].
However, as late as September 1993, the IRS did not necessarily have an attorney review the
personnel files pursuant to a Henthorn request. See Litigation Guideline Memorandum from the
Assistant Chief Counsel, Criminal Tax, to All Deputy Regional Counsel (Sept. 3, 1993) (on file with
Washington Law Review). It states:
It is our view that the immediate supervisor [not necessarily an attorney] of the requested
employee-witness should be responsible for conducting the examination of testifying IRS
employee personnel files. For example, if the witness is a special agent, the group manager
should handle the review. If the witness is an attorney in a District Counsel office, the ADC
should handle the review. If the witness is in the National Office, the branch chief should handle
the review.
Id. Clearly, between September 1993 and August 1995, the IRS changed its official policy to require
that an IRS attorney actually participate in the review. It is unclear, however, when the change in
policy was implemented and how many non-attorney supervisors were charged with the task of
reviewing the files.
145. Krng Declaration, supra note 144, referred to in Brief for the United States at 8, Herring
(No. 95-10521).
146. Id. The four categories of files that may be subject to review under the IRS procedure are: (1)
Official Personnel Files; (2) Employee Personnel Files; (3) Drop Files; and (4) Employee
Investigative Files.
147. Id.
148. Declaration of James D. Whaley, Chief Division Counsel, San Francisco Division, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Lacy (No. CR-94-0384-MHP), reprinted in Excerpt of Record at 173 exh.
E, Herring (No. 95-10521), referred to in Brief for the United States at 8, Herring (No. 95-10521).
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results of the bureau's review to the FBI's Office of General Counsel in
Washington, D.C. That office undertakes a review of additional files
maintained at FBI headquarters. These files contain information
"concerning administrative inquiries or investigations" relating to
"[allegations] of improper or illegal conduct." '149 The Office of General
Counsel then informs the prosecutor of the results of its search.
B. A Look Behind the Scenes-the Problems with the Official Review
Policies.
1. From the Agencies 'Perspective
For at least the past two years, the Attorney General's Advisory
Committee (AGAC), 50 the Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice (DOJ), the Office of Investigative Agency Policies,'5' and the
federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, the DEA, and the
INS, have attempted to devise a more uniform policy governing the
review of personnel files for impeachment material.5 a The formulation
of a uniform policy seems to be of ever-greater importance, given the
growing number of requests for files by defense counsel, especially in
the Ninth Circuit, where Henthorn governs. 15 3
Among the issues that are being addressed are:
149. Id.
150. The Attorney General's Advisory Committee of U.S. Attorneys consists of fifteen U.S.
Attorneys, designated by the Attorney General. The membership is selected to represent the various
geographic areas of the nation and both large and small offices. Members serve at the pleasure of the
Attorney General. The Committee makes recommendations to the Attorney General, to the Deputy
Attorney General and to the Associate Attorney General concerning any matters that the Committee
believes to be in the best interests of justice, including establishing and modifying policies and
procedures of the Department. 28 C.F.R. § 0.10 (1996).
151. The mandate of the Office of Investigative Agency Policies is to increas,. efficiency within
the Department by coordinating specified activities of the Department's criminal investigative
components and by advising the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General on all criminal
investigative policies, procedures, and activities that warrant uniform treatment or coordination. 28
C.F.R. § 0.17 (1996).
152. Airtel communication from Freeb, supra note 32.
153. Although the government does not keep official statistics on the nationwide number of
requests for reviews of personnel files, the Chief Counsel of the DEA, in a 1995 iremorandum to the
U.S. Attorneys within the Ninth Circuit, wrote that his office processes a "large number" of reviews:
"For example, during the 1993 calendar year alone, we processed approximately 800 Henthorn
reviews." The reviews are not easily accomplished: "Depending on the particular circumstances,
each review may take several hours or up to several days to complete. Frequently, older files must be
retrieved from the archives for review which is a time-consuming process." Memorandum from
Dennis F. Hoffinan, supra note 5.
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(1) the types of disciplinary information that must be disclosed; (2)
the degree of certainty that misconduct has occurred that triggers
disclosure; (3) the stage in the investigation when disclosure must
be made; and (4) the extent to which prosecutors may retain in their
systems of records for future retrieval disciplinary information from
the personnel files of law enforcement personnel.1
54
As the AGAC, the DOJ, and the law enforcement agencies struggled
to reach agreement on these and other issues, the FBI set forth its
"interim guidance" to assist field offices in the review of personnel files
for potential impeachment material. 5 The "interim guidance," which
came out in late 1995, advised agents that, in general, they were rarely
obligated to disclose unsubstantiated allegations or accusations of which
they had been exonerated: "Allegations of misconduct that are not
credible, cannot be proved, or result in the exoneration of an employee-
witness are rarely considered to be impeaching material."'5 6
On April 10, 1996, the AGAC circulated a memorandum to the
various federal law enforcement agencies, proposing that even
unsubstantiated allegations against an agent be disclosed.15 7 In a
responding memorandum sent collectively by the Director of the FBI, the
Chief Administrator of the DEA, the Director of the U.S. Marshal's
154. Airtel communication from Freeh, supra note 32, at 2.
155. Id. at 1. The FBI Director's Airtel states:
The purpose of this airtel is to provide guidance concerning the disclosure to federal prosecutors
of disciplinary information about FBI employees who will be affiants or witnesses in criminal
prosecutions. Federal judicial districts and circuits have not provided uniform standards
concerning the methods by which disciplinary information is located and evaluated for
submission to a court for review as potential impeaching material. In addition, United States
Attorneys' offices have not taken a consistent approach concerning the methods by which
prosecutors obtain access to such information from FBI field offices and/or FBIHQ [FBI
headquarters].
Because of the lack of a clear and uniform standard for disclosure, there has been confusion
about the obligation of Agents or other employees to notify a prosecutor of information that
might be used to impeach their testimony. As a result, convictions have been reversed, and
others are now in jeopardy because of the failure of government employees to disclose such
information to prosecutors during preparation for trial.
Id.
156. Id. at 2.
157. Memorandum from Louis J. Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Thomas
A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration; Eduardo Gonzalez, Director, U.S.
Marshal's Service; Doris M. Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service; and
Michael R. Bromwich, Inspector General, to Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General for the
U.S. Department of Justice (May 7, 1996) (on file with Washington Law Review) [hereinafter
Memorandum from Federal Agency Heads] (responding to memorandum from Attorney General's
Advisory Committee (Apr. 10, 1996)).
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Service, the Commissioner of the INS, and the Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General, to the Deputy Attorney General, the
agency heads expressed their strong opposition to the Department's
position that even unsubstantiated allegations or accusations that have
resulted in exoneration should be disclosed. '58 The agency heads tried to
walk the line between complying with the requirements of Brady/Giglio
and protecting, to the extent possible, the reputations and privacy of their
employees. While acknowledging that there might be instances when
exonerations or unsubstantiated allegations should be turned over, the
agency heads objected to the Department's policy requiring that they
"routinely disclose such information absent an underlying legal
requirement or a particularized showing of need."'59 The agency heads
cited Brady in support of their position against disclosure. "The fact that
an allegation was investigated and found not to have occurred is legally
significant since the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that Brady does
not require disclosure of 'preliminary, challenged, or speculative
information." 61
The agency officials disagreed with the AGAC's argument that such
allegations should be disclosed to protect the prosecution and the agent
from ambush: "[T]he contention that the defense bar is likely to be aware
of exonerated allegations [sic] that may have been publicized or those
initiated by a judge, magistrate judge, or prosecutor, while the
prosecution will not be aware of them, is speculative and
insupportable."' 6'
The agency heads also argued vehemently against another of the
Department's proposals, namely, that U.S. Attorney's Offices start
keeping logs of allegations against agents. Such logs would "prove most
158. Id.
159. Id. at4.
160. Id. at 3 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109 n.16 (1976) (quoting Giles v.
Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, 3., concurring))).
161. Id. at 5. See also the following argument from the agencies:
[Tihe AGAC states that "if there is no indication that the defense is aware of this sort of
information, and if the prosecution is comfortable that the information in question is not Giglio,
then the prosecution will keep the information confidential and will not file a motion in limine."
Since the defense is under no obligation to notify the prosecutor in advance of what information
it will attempt to use to impeach Government witnesses, the prosecutor will often not know what
information the defense possesses until cross-examination. The risk of ambush .*s no greater for
exonerated allegations initiated by judges or prosecutors than it is for any other type of
exonerated allegations.
Id. at 5 (citation omitted).
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detrimental to agency employees [and] should not be permitted."1 62
Understandably concerned with protecting the privacy of their
employees, 63 the agency heads balked at the idea of a prosecutor keeping
what would essentially amount to a permanent log of agents whose files
had been reviewed. Their primary concern was that a log could be
"misused by a prosecutor to determine whether that [agent] is a
potentially 'problematic' witness. Such a demoralizing prospect, in the
face of no actual benefits, is not worth chancing."'' "
Some FBI agents are convinced that the larger U.S. Attorney's
Offices, such as those in Chicago and Los Angeles, do in fact keep logs
of allegations of misconduct by agents.165 The FBI has instructed its
agents to "insist that prosecutors return material from FBI personnel files
and to rely on the FBI as the sole repository for such information when it
is needed in the future."'" As one agent put it, "I don't want my file in
the hands of a prosecutor who may one day leave the U.S. Attorney's
Office and go to the other side."' 6
7
The debate between the Department of Justice and the federal law
enforcement agencies may be quelled somewhat with the implementation
of a recently adopted policy, approved by the Attorney General of the
United States, regarding the disclosure to prosecutors of potential
impeachment information concerning law enforcement agency
witnesses. As of the time this Article went to press, this policy was
scheduled to take effect on April 8, 1997. It will apply to all Department
of Justice investigative agencies.
69
162. Id. at6.
163. See, e.g., Memorandum from Mueller, supra note 5, at 2 ("Because personnel files are
extremely private, the federal investigative agencies are reluctant to ship these files to AUSAs as a
routine matter. For this reason, each agency feels strongly that it should first examine the pertinent
files and advise the AUSA if the files contain any information bearing on the agent's credibility.").
164. Memorandum from Federal Agency Heads, supra note 157, at 7.
165. Telephone Interviews with present and former Special Agents of the FBI (May-Sept., 1996).
166. Airtel communication from Freeb, supra note 32, at 7.
167. Interview with anonymous Special Agent from the FBI, in Seattle, Wash. (July 26, 1996).
168. Office of the Attorney General, Policy Regarding the Disclosure to Prosecutors of Potential
Impeachment Information Concerning Law Enforcement Agency Witnesses ("Giglio Policy")
(signed by Janet Reno, Attorney General, Dec. 9, 1996) [hereinafter "DOJ Policy"] (on file with
Washington Law Review).
169. Id. at 1; Memorandum from Carol DiBattiste, Director, Executive Office for the United
States Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, to All United States Attorneys 1 (Dec. 13, 1996) (on
file with Washington Law Review). Additionally, the Department of Treasury has agreed to issue the
same policy for its investigative agencies. Id.
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Although the Department's new policy does not mention Henthorn by
name and so cannot be taken as a formal policy regarding Henthorn
requests in particular, it does appear applicable to Henthorn issues in the
Ninth Circuit. 170 The stated purpose of the policy "is to ensure that
prosecutors receive sufficient information [from agencies] to meet their
[disclosure] obligations, while [still] protecting the legitimate privacy
rights of Government employees., 17  The policy presumes that the
prosecutor will generally be able to obtain all potential impeachment
information directly from the agent witness. 172 Nevertheless, the policy
sets forth procedures for those cases when a prosecutor decides to request
additional information from the investigative agency,'73 presumably
when he is not satisfied with the information provided by the agent.
Under the new policy, upon a request by a prosecutor, the employing
agency will be required to conduct a review for findings of misconduct
that reflect upon the truthfulness or possible bias of an employee, any
past or pending criminal charge brought against an employee, and any
credible allegation of misconduct that reflects upon the truthfulness or
bias of the employee. The policy indicates that an agency official shall
conduct the review, but does not say whether that official must be a
lawyer. 75
In the context of Henthorn reviews, the Department's new policy will
add very little to the scope of the reviews the agencies are already
engaged in, with a few exceptions. One exception is that the policy
requires agencies to provide prosecutors with information regarding even
those allegations that are unsubstantiated, not credible, or have resulted
in exoneration of the employee, under certain narrow circumstances.1
76
The policy strikes a compromise between the agencies and the
Department on the issue of whether prosecutors may retain records, such
as the logs discussed earlier, of impeachment items that they have
170. Memorandum from Harry J. McCarthy, Chief of the Criminal Division, United States
Attorney's Office, 'Western District of Washington, to All Criminal AUSA's (Dec. 19, 1996) (on file
with Washington Law Review).
171. DOJ Policy, supra note 168, at 1.
172. Id. at 1-2.
173. Id. at2.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. One of the narrow circumstances triggering disclosure to the prosecutor is the following:
"(a) when the Requesting Official advises the Agency Official that it is required by a Court decision
in the district where the investigation or case is being pursued." Id. Defense counsel in the Ninth
Circuit could certainly make the argument that Henthorn is the decision alluded to in this provision.
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learned about various agents. The policy allows prosecutors to maintain
such records, but only of impeachment material that has been disclosed
to defense counsel. 7 The policy prohibits prosecutors from maintaining
records of potential impeachment material disclosed to the court in
camera but not to the defense.1
78
2. From the Prosecutor's Perspective1
71
At the end of the day, it is the Federal prosecutors nationwide-
especially those within the Ninth Circuit-who bear the responsibility of
complying with requests for discovery of personnel files. It is upon their
shoulders that these discovery requests weigh most heavily, for they are
the ones who must determine whether a personnel file or a portion of a
file must be disclosed. Although a prosecutor may be able to rely on an
agency to cull materials in a personnel file, it is the prosecutor himself
who must decide what to disclose, or, when he cannot decide, whether to
submit the file to the court for an in camera review. Failure to disclose
what is later deemed by a court to be Brady material can result in the
reversal of a conviction and in a written sanction or reprimand from the
court.
180
Many prosecutors, especially those in the Ninth Circuit, are uncertain
of the parameters of their responsibilities of review and disclosure and
would welcome more guidance from the Department of Justice or the
courts. Notwithstanding the most recent decisions from the Ninth Circuit
resolving (at least for now) some of the issues raised by Henthorn,"8'
many questions remain regarding how to comply with Henthorn
requests, and, at the same time, protect the privacy and personal interests
of agents.
The following discussion raises some of the issues that federal
prosecutors, in particular, face. The issues are discussed from the
perspective of the many prosecutors interviewed for this Article, most of
177. Id. at 4.
178. Id.
179. The sources for this subsection are all Assistant U.S. Attorneys presently practicing within
the Ninth Circuit. They spoke on the condition of anonymity and on condition that the citations or
docket numbers of cases not be revealed. Accordingly, although the case summaries in this section
are based on real cases, they are not specifically identified. These interviews were conducted
between May and September of 1996.
180. Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995).
181. United States v. Herring, 83 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d
1488 (9th Cir. 1992).
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whom work in the Ninth Circuit, where Henthorn makes these issues
more common. But federal prosecutors in other circuits are not insulated
from these problems, especially in light of the uncertainty of the law1 2
and the U.S. Supreme Court's broad interpretation of a prosecutor's
responsibilities enunciated in Kyles.
Most prosecutors and law enforcement agents see themselves as
members of a "federal family," sticking together through the highs and
lows of complex and lengthy investigations and prosecutions, many of
which are potentially dangerous to the agents who investigate and to the
prosecutors who charge. But in 1991, the Henthorn decision began to
divide the family in ways not seen before. Seemingly out of the blue,
prosecutors were forced to ask for reviews of agents' personnel files,
calling into question the entire premise of the prosecutor-agent
relationship: implicit trust in the integrity of another member of the
family. The following case summaries illuminate some of the new
tensions.
A prosecutor was preparing to try several members of a major
kidnapping ring. The defendants and the victims all spoke Mandarin
Chinese only, so the prosecutor requested that the FBI assign to the case
an agent who could speak Mandarin Chinese. The FBI complied with his
request, and the prosecutor worked with the FBI agent for several
months. During this time, the agent not only interviewed the victims, but,
in transporting and fingerprinting the defendants, obtained inculpatory
statements from them. The prosecutor planned to call the agent at trial,
primarily for his testimony about the defendants' inculpatory statements.
Several weeks before trial, one of the lawyers for the defense made a
written Henthorn request. The prosecutor asked the FBI to conduct a
Henthorn review of the agent's file. The FBI's response was immediate:
the agent had "a Henthorn problem."'83 Two things were clear to the
prosecutor: (1) he could not call the agent at trial"s and would not,
therefore, be able to introduce the inculpatory statements made by the
182. Airtel communication from Freeh, supra note 32.
183. The "Henthorn problem" in this case was a shoplifting accusation that dated back more than
six years. The agent, who was employed by the FBI at the time, maintained his innocence, but, in
order to obtain a "pre-trial diversion" of his case, acknowledged that he had committed the crime.
The Henthorn problem arose not only from the fact that the agent may have shoplifted more than six
years earlier, but also from his failure to inform his employer, the FBI, about tha accusation at the
time it was made.
184. The Assistant U.S. Attorney was emphatic about not calling the agent at trial: "They [the
defense] would have made this guy the centerpiece of the trial. They would have tried to smear the
FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office." Interview with Anonymous A, Assistant U.S. Attorney in Ninth
Circuit, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 15, 1996) (see supra note 179).
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defendants; and (2), the FBI had known about the agent's Henthorn
problem before assigning him to the case, but had not told the prosecutor
about it.'85
In another case, a defense attorney made a Henthorn request for the
personnel file of a postal inspector. The Postal Service told the
prosecutor that there was no Henthorn material in the agent's personnel
file. The prosecutor relayed this response to the defense attorney, who
then made a second Henthorn request, this time particularizing by name
other files in which personnel information was likely to be found. The
prosecutor asked the Service to inspect the particular files named in the
second Henthorn request. Indeed, impeachment material was discovered
in those files, and, because this agent was the key government witness,
the prosecutor dismissed the charges. 6
Still another case illustrates the struggle prosecutors face when
deciding whether to disclose information in a personnel file. Anticipating
a Henthorn request, a federal prosecutor in a tax evasion case asked the
IRS to review the personnel files of IRS employees who might testify at
trial. 7 The search turned up a problem. One of the IRS agents had
written a derogatory comment about his supervisor in his daily work
diary. 8 Uncertain whether Henthorn required her to turn over the
information and concerned that the agent would be made to look foolish
on the stand, she elected not to call the agent, thus avoiding the need to
make a decision. To this day, however, she wonders whether she would
185. The prosecutor's response: "I wish they [the FBI] had just told me. I wouldn't have used
him, but I wouldn't have had to carve up my case to take him out just before trial." Id.
186. The material stemmed primarily from several disciplinary sanctions that had been brought by
the Service against the inspector for his failure to keep investigative files, which was an issue in the
instant case. The prosecutor surmised that the defendant, a former postal worker, must have heard
about the agent's personnel problems from his time at the post office and, being a former postal
employee, knew the names of the various kinds of files likely to contain personnel information.
Interview with Anonymous B, Assistant U.S. Attorney in Ninth Circuit, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 15,
1996) (see supra note 179).
187. Interview with Anonymous C, Assistant U.S. Attorney in Ninth Circuit, Seattle, Wash. (Aug.
15, 1996) (see supra note 179). Although Henthorn speaks only of "testifying officers," the
prosecutor in this case understood Henthorn to mean that the file of any government employee who
might testify at trial was subject to review.
The Ninth Circuit has yet to decide whether Henthorn extends to the files of any government
employee who will testify, or to those of criminal law enforcement agents only. Here, the testifying
IRS employees were civil revenue agents and civil collections agents. Obviously, the more prudent
course for a prosecutor would be to ask for a review of all government employee files.
188. The IRS agent was suspended for 30 days for calling his female supervisor a "wildebeest" in
his work diary. Id.
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have had to disclose the incident had she called the agent to testify.'89
The agent had not been disciplined for an act of dishonesty. If anything,
he had been punished because he did not mask his true feelings-he had
been too honest. 90
Some prosecutors believe that they have an obligation to share an
agent's Henthorn material with other prosecutors who work with that
agent in subsequent cases:
How are we supposed to forget the information after one case, and
let the agent go on to the next investigation without informing those
prosecutors? If the agent is removed from this district because of a
Henthorn problem and is transferred to Nevada, do we have an
obligation to inform Nevada? It's not Brady yet, but it may be if the
prosecutor there gets a Henthorn request. 191
Finally, many prosecutors worry about still another looming
consequence of Henthorn-that convicted defendants will increasingly
claim ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal whenever their lawyers
failed to make pre-trial requests for discovery of personnel files. 92
189. Id.
190. Another case illustrates the prosecutorial dilemma even further. In this instance, a Henthorn
review revealed that 10 years earlier, when the agent had applied for his position with the
government, he had initially failed to indicate on his application that he had once used an alias. Upon
realizing that he had failed to report his alias, the agent revised his application. The revision
indicated that 10 years prior to the Henthorn review he had rented an apartment with a girlfriend and,
in order to survive the landlord's scrutiny, had assumed the girlfriend's last name on the rental
application. The prosecutor was uncertain whether this information should be disclosed. Id.
191. Telephone Interview with Haines, supra note 44; see also Telephone Interview with Krinsky,
supra note 56.
192. Telephone Interview with Haines, supra note 44; see Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant challenging voluntariness of guilty plea could assert Brady
claim).
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3. From the Criminal Defense Attorney's Perspective-The Fox
Guarding the Chicken Coop?193
Federal criminal defense lawyers complain that they rarely receive any
information pursuant to a request for a review of a personnel file.
Perhaps that is because many prosecutors elect to "deal" a case before
having to disclose impeachment material to the defense:
In most cases, if an AUSA learns of a problem, he will give the
defendant a better deal on a plea so as not to rain an agent's career.
We'd work out a deal-give them a year or two off rather than take
our loss in front of a jury which demands absolute honesty from
government agents. The bottom line is that we deal the case or put
someone else on to testify. The defense may never know that we
had a problem with a particular witness. 19
4
One of the most common complaints of defense attorneys about the
government's review of personnel files for Brady or Giglio material is
193. In order to conduct the research for this section, the following 10-question survey was sent
via e-mail to every Federal Public Defender's office in the nation. Responses were received from 21
of the 58 Federal Public Defender's offices. Survey of Federal Public Defenders, supra note 5. Also
interviewed were several of the private practice defense attorneys involved in the Ninth Circuit cases
discussed in part HI of this Article. This was an informal survey, and is not offered here for its
statistical value. The survey's value is anecdotal.
1. In what percentage of cases have you asked AUSAs to review the personnel file of a
testifying government agent for Brady/Giglio material?
2. How have you made this request, i.e. as part of your general written discovery request or as a
separate request?
3. At what stage of the case do you make the request, i.e. before/during/after plea negotiations?
4. Are you making these requests in an increasing/decreasing number?
5. What responses have you received from the AUSAs upon making such a request?
6. In what percentage of cases have you received discovery from an AUSA regarding a
testifying agent's personnel file? What was the discovery material?
7. How did you use the discovery? (Cross-examination of government agent, for example.)
8. In what percentage of cases have you received no discovery following your request for the
AUSA to review a testifying agent's personnel file?
9. In what percentage of cases have you made a request for an AUSA to review a particular
agent's personnel file, only to be told (or to find out at trial) that the agent will not testify
after all?
10. How often has your request for a personnel file review led to an in camera review of the file
by the court? What happened after the in camera review?
194. Telephone Interview with Haines, supra note 44.
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that it "smacks of the fox guarding the chicken coop."'95 As lead defense
counsel in Lacy said: "The agencies just wave a wand at the documents. I
don't blame the prosecutors for not knowing what's in those files when
the agencies have it in their own best interest not to tell them."'96 And
yet, defense attorneys nationwide have been making an increasing
number of requests for discovery of personnel files, 97 usually after
reviewing the government's general discovery and determining that the
case will probably go to trial.'
In the overwhelming majority of cases in which defense lawyers have
made such requests, the government has not turned over discovery from
the agent's personnel file.' 99 Some defense attorneys-both inside and
outside the Ninth Circuit-have said that the government has tried to
"stonewall"200 their efforts to obtain discovery of personnel files.2 '
195. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Discovery of Personnel Files at 9, United
States v. Lacy, 896 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (No. CR-94-0384-MIP), reprinted in Excerpt of
Record at 94, United States v. Herring, 83 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-10521) [hereinafter
Leidman brief].
196. Interview with Leidman, supra note 51. In his brief to the district court in Lacy, Mr. Leidman
wrote:
The defense urges most strenuously against this procedure for the obvious "fox guarding the
chicken coop" reason that it is hard to believe that an agency's legal staff has any motive other
than to hide material which the defense should properly receive by "characterizing" them [sic]
as non-exculpatory. While it is true that under Kyles, the United States Attorney would be
charged with the Brady violation if exculpatory material was disclosed later which was earlier
withheld and reversal of a conviction could result, it is hard to conceive of how suppression of
evidence by an agency's legal counsel would be uncovered.
Leidman Brief, supra note 195, at 9.
197. See Survey of Federal Public Defenders, supra note 5.
198. Sample answers included the following: "In all cases that may go to trial a Henthorn request
is made," from Roger Peven, Chief Trial Attorney, Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington and
Idaho; "Only started asking recently, now I ask in 100% of my cases that look like they will be
trials," from Thomas Thornton, Assistant Federal Public Defender (AFPD) at Middle District of
Pennsylvania, Williamsport, Penn.; "I make a request in all cases in which a federal agent will testify
and in which it is apparent that the case will be tried," from Franny Forsman, AFPD in Las Vegas,
Nev. Survey of Federal Public Defenders, supra note 5.
199. The respondents to the survey indicated that they have not received discovery pursuant to
Henthorn requests between 75% and 100% of the times they have made such requests. Survey of
Federal Public Defenders, supra note 5.
200. David Phillips, AFPD, in Kansas City, Kan.. See Survey of Federal Public Defenders, supra
note 5.
201. For example, Anthony Gallagher, AFPD in Great Falls Mont. stated that, "[t]hey [the
government] will usually fight the request vehemently if it's an FBI, DEA, or ATF agent; they are
not so protective of BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs] police, but still refuse unless we can make a
particularized showing in our initial request"; Thomas Thornton, AFPD in Williamsport, Penn. said
the government responds with "[d]isdain and they never find anything"; and Vionnette Reyes,
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According to the defense attorneys surveyed, only rarely have discovery
requests for personnel files led to in camera review, and rarely has a
court ordered disclosure of material from the file after an in camera
review." 2 The defense lawyers who were interviewed or surveyed for
this Article generally agreed, however, that their increasing pressure for
review and disclosure of agency personnel files has been helpful in
obtaining more favorable plea offers from the government.2 3
IV. CONCLUSION: SOME PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Given the increasing number of discovery requests for agent personnel
files2" both within and outside the Ninth Circuit, prosecutors are more
and more likely to be compelled to review the personnel files of
Federal Defender Program, Inc. in Atlanta, Ga. said that the government "ignore[s] it [the request]."
See Survey of Federal Public Defenders, supra note 5.
Survey results in response to question 5, which asked, "What responses have you received from
the AUSAs upon making such a request?," included: "Opposition. It doesn't seem spirited, but
almost pro forma. As a result, we go to the court, and the court usually huffs and puffs and then
grants it. It is easier to grant than to give us an issue on appeal," from Jon Sands, AFPD in Phoenix,
Ariz.; "Requests are met by (1) silence; (2) there's nothing in the file; (3) we won't call him as a
witness," from Franny Forsman, AFPD in Las Vegas, Nev.; "Usually they claim negative. In a few
cases we have had hits such as an agent [who] was investigated for DUI, molesting a stepchild,
misuse of official fiinds, etc. Usually the response has been to the judge, in camera, and then the
judge discloses to defense counsel," from Fred Kay, AFPD in Tucson, Ariz. See Survey of Federal
Public Defenders, supra note 5.
202. From Anthony Gallagher, AFPD in Great Falls, Mont., "Only in one case in which we
requested an ATF agent's personnel file did the court indicate that it would revisit the issue after an
in camera review of the file. Before the court conducted the review, the witness was withdrawn by
the government." From Miriam Siefer, AFPD in Detroit, Mich.:
We have been successful in a few cases to get the court to review the personnel file in camera.
However, we have never been given any discovery/impeachment material from the file. In one
case there were rumors that one of the DEA agents was shaking down informants. We were
aware of an internal investigation. The court reviewed the personnel file in camera but ruled that
none of the materials was Brady.
See Survey of Federal Public Defenders, supra note 5.
203. Henry Bemporad, AFPD in San Antonio, Tex., wrote "[s]ome cases are so stacked that evil
things in personnel files will not affect the defendant's chances at trial, though the request may be a
factor in the disposition." His requests are met with "slow compliance and sometimes a deal that is
worth taking while the request is pending." Jon Sands, AFPD in Phoenix, Ariz. wrote, "you can use
it [a Henthorn request] to get a good deal." Fred Kay, AFPD in Tucson, Ariz. wrote, "[d]iselosure
likely has resulted in better plea offers." See Survey of Federal Public Defenders, supra note 5.
Some defenders have had even more dramatic results: Michael Kennedy, AFPD in Sacramento,
Cal. wrote that he has used Henthorn discovery in "cross examination [and] in one case, dismissal of
the indictment." See Survey of Federal Public Defenders, supra note 5.
204. The survey results showed an increasing number of requests. See Survey of Federal Public
Defenders, supra note 5.
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testifying federal agents. Although many prosecutors would like the
court to impose a "showing of materiality" standard (as the Sixth Circuit
requires),20 5 it may be safe to predict that in the wake of the U.S.
Supreme Court's dicta in Kyles, courts will be less inclined to impose
such a showing on defendants.2 6 It is also possible that a defense
lawyer's failure to request discovery of an agent's personnel file will
surface more frequently in appeals as grounds for an ineffective
assistance of counsel argument.20 7
Considering the difficulty that defendants have historically had in
meeting the "showing of materiality" standard,2 8 courts outside the
Ninth Circuit-and the U.S. Supreme Court, should it choose to resolve
the split-should dispense with that standard. It is virtually impossible
for a defendant to identify Brady or Giglio material in a file that she has
not seen.2 9 As the law presently stands in the circuits that require the
defendant to make a materiality showing before triggering the
government's obligation to review a personnel file, it is entirely
possible-and even probable-that a file containing impeachment
material will never be reviewed, let alone disclosed. This approach is not
205. United States v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472 (6th Cir. 1992). The prosecutors interviewed for this
article were united in their belief that the defendant should have to make some prior showing of
materiality, that is, some showing that something of material importance to the defendant's defense
would be contained in the relevant files before the prosecutor would be required to inspect the files.
Roger W. Haines, Jr. offered one example of a fairly low burden of proof:
The defense lawyer should at least be able to say that his client told him X and the agent is
testifying to Y, therefore there is a discrepancy in the two stories, and one person must be lying.
Then a review of the personnel file might be justified to see if there is anything to lend credence
to the defendant's argument that the agent is lying.
Telephone Interview with Haines, supra note 44.
The problem, of course, with a general "showing of materiality" standard is that the defendant or
his lawyer may have met the agent only briefly, may know nothing of his past, and, therefore, have
no idea of what specifically to ask for in the files.
206. If this is true, then the prosecution will have less room to "stonewall" the defense, leading to
a freer flow of discovery between prosecutor and defense attorney.
207. Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995).
208. See United States v. Valentine, No. 94-6195, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16584, at *1 (6th Cir.
June 30, 1995); United States v. Lafayette, 983 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v.
Driscoll, 970 F.2d 1472 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Lampkin, Crim. Action No.
96-0103 (JHG), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7262, at *1 (D.D.C. May 28, 1996); see also supra notes
33-38.
209. This was the same concern that troubled Chief Justice Marshall more than a century and a
half ago in United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14694): "Now, if a paper
be in possession of the opposite party, what statement of its contents or applicability can be expected
from the person who claims its production, he not precisely knowing its contents?" Id. at 191.
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intrusive enough. That being said, the author does not urge the adoption
of the Henthorn standard in its place. The Henthorn rule has the potential
to be needlessly intrusive into the privacy of federal agents, subjecting
them to the possible exposure of every "wart" of their professional lives,
no matter how far back in time their mistakes may have been made.
There should be some limitation on a defendant's ability to expose
irrelevant information. The author recommends, therefore, a nationwide
standard that fashions 'a compromise between the two approaches, one
that is more fair to defendants than the "showing of materiality"
requirement but is at least somewhat more protective than Henthorn of
the privacy of agents.
One possibility would be to fashion a rule that distinguishes among
kinds of witnesses. For example, the automatic rule of Henthorn could
apply to witnesses whose testimony and credibility would be at issue at
trial. In contrast, the defendant would be required to make a prima facie
showing of materiality before triggering the government's obligation to
review personnel files of agents whose testimony would be undisputed,
as is often the case, for example, with chain of custody witnesses or
records custodians. The problem with this solution, of course, is that the
credibility of any government witness may be crucial to the defense,
depending on the facts of the particular case. Moreover, while in many
cases the defendant may choose not to attack the chain of custody for
particular evidence, if he were aware of information that undermined the
credibility of a chain of custody witness, his tactics might change. Thus,
the courts would be extremely reluctant to base the government's
obligations to review personnel files on distinctions among categories of
agent witnesses.
It may be possible, however, to limit the number of personnel files
reviewed in a particular case by cooperation between the prosecutor and
defense attorney. If the prosecutor is willing to disclose a witness list to
the defense well in advance of trial, indicating the general subject matter
of each witness's testimony, it may be possible for the parties to agree on
which testimony would not be disputed at trial. In these cases, the
defense might be willing to forego a Henthorn request for a review of
those agents' files. This approach mirrors some of the agencies'
recommendations210 and potentially may reduce the number of Henthorn
requests and reviews. Of course, defense attorneys may not be willing to
accept the prosecutor's assertion that particular witnesses are
interchangeable or testifying only to uncontested matters. Indeed, the
210. Memorandum from Mueller, supra note 5.
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prosecutor herself may not know before trial which witnesses are
essential and which are not. Thus, although it is worthwhile for the
parties to try to reach an agreement in any given case on the scope of
files to be reviewed, this approach is unlikely to reduce significantly the
government's obligation under the Henthorn standard.
To limit the intrusiveness of Henthorn, a "statute of limitations" could
bar the disclosure of potential impeachment material that stems from
incidents too remote in an agent's past to be of continuing impeachment
value or relevance. Although this proposal raises obvious questions of
line-drawing (that is, when does an agent's history become ancient
history?), courts are quite accustomed to making similar calls when they
weigh the relevance of requested discovery material against its
prejudicial value. Obviously, some personnel file entries will always be
relevant and material, no matter how old. Convictions for perjury, or
reprimands for falsifying evidence or engaging in otherwise egregious
conduct would always be relevant, even when remote, to impeach the
witness's credibility at trial. But other personnel file entries-for
example, an agent's use of his girlfriend's last name in order to secure an
apartment some ten years earlier-are probably too remote to be relevant
and should not be dredged up in an attempt to embarrass. A five to ten
year limitation on most personnel file entries would limit at least
somewhat the number of disclosures, while still allowing the defense
access to relevant entries."'
Although it is important to limit the intrusiveness of Henthorn, this
Article has suggested that the Ninth Circuit standard is in some ways not
broad enough. The Dominguez-Villa exemption of the personnel files of
state and local officers from the reach of Henthorn requests is outdated in
terms of today's law enforcement, when there are increasing numbers of
state and local officers working closely with federal agents on task forces
coordinated by the Federal government."2 The testimony, and therefore
the credibility, of state and local law enforcement officers may be as
critical to the government's case as those of federal agents. The rationale
of Dominguez- Villa-that the files of local police departments are not in
the "possession" of the federal authorities and are therefore beyond the
government's responsibility or the court's control-rings hollow given a
211. The presumptive limitations cut-off could be patterned after Federal Rule of Evidence
609(b), see supra note 91, or California Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, see supra text
accompanying note 90, which contain a five year statute of limitations on disclosure of entries from
police personnel files. Any limitations period should be presumptive rather than conclusive, allowing
a defense attorney to argue to the court that an exception should be made in a particular case.
212. See United States v. Dominguez-Villa, 954 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1992).
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federal prosecutor's ability to obtain, through agreement, access to the
files of local officers who work in tandem with federal agents. Moreover,
the Dominguez-Villa exception for the personnel files of state and local
officers seems to clash with Justice Souter's dicta in Kyles v. Whitley,
where the Court held the government responsible for information in other
kinds of files kept by local police. Therefore, federal prosecutors and
federal law enforcement agencies should require that state and local law
enforcement agencies agree to comply with Henthorn requests, as a
condition of their working on task forces receiving federal money. State
and local law enforcement agencies routinely enter into memoranda of
understanding with federal authorities in joining a joint task force. These
memoranda of understanding could include a provision that requires state
and local law enforcement agencies to submit personnel files for review.
Although the state and local law enforcement agencies will probably not
embrace the imposition of this new requirement (and may mount barriers
to meeting such a requirement), prosecutors will be better able to plan
their cases, more secure in knowing that all of the agents they may
eventually call to testify at trial have passed a Henthorn review.
By the same reasoning, prosecutors should review the exonerations or
unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct that appear in agents'
personnel files. Although most prosecutors will probably determine that,
in most cases, the entries should not be turned over to the defense, or
even subject to an in camera review, they should at least have inspected
these entries to assure compliance with Henthorn requests. The
prosecutor should also consider reviewing the method by which the
allegations were found to be unsubstantiated or the agent exonerated.
The danger of which the prosecutor should at least be aware is that the
agent's exoneration may well have come from the agency's internal
investigation, a process that may be suspect to many defense attorneys.
Although the agencies have been waging a campaign against the
disclosure of these personnel file entries to even the prosecutor, and the
Department's new policy for disclosure of these materials to the
prosecutor is very narrowly drawn, it behooves the agencies to recognize
that such disclosure may ultimately protect agents from being ambushed
in cross-examination by defense lawyers who have learned of these
allegations from other sources. If the prosecutor is unaware of the
allegations, she would be unprepared to repair the agent's lost credibility,
and thus risk damaging the effectiveness of the agent's entire testimony.
Finally, the Department of Justice should keep a log or history of
Henthorn-type requests, detailing the results of all Henthorn reviews that
have resulted in potential impeachment material being turned over to the
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prosecutor. Each prosecutor in the field should be held responsible for
updating the log on the particular agents with whom she has worked. The
Department's new policy of allowing prosecutors to maintain records
only of potential impeachment material disclosed to the defense does not
go far enough. Such a narrow policy does not adequately take into
consideration two important policy reasons for allowing the prosecutors
broader access to the results of prior Henthorn reviews. First, a national
database or log, kept in a secure manner to protect the agents' privacy,
would serve as the institutional memory of the Department on disclosure
issues, enabling prosecutors to look at earlier Henthorn-,y'.pe requests to
see how courts have resolved Henthorn disputes. In this sense, the log
would have a kind of precedent value, detailing what kind of personnel
information has had to be disclosed, and what the courts have allowed to
be withheld. Such a database could serve (perhaps to the surprise of
agencies reluctant to acquiesce in the idea of a Henthorn log) to protect
certain entries from disclosure to the defense. In other words, once one
trial judge has found in an in camera review that a particular file entry on
a particular agent should not be disclosed to the defense, a prosecutor is
in good standing to use that finding to convince any subsequent trial
judges that the entries should not be disclosed. In order to use the
information, however, the prosecutor would need to know about the prior
Henthorn request, and the outcome of the court's in camera review.
Second, the log would allow prosecutors in one district to alert those
in other districts of a particular agent's Henthorn history."1 3 To the extent
that the Court in Kyles indicated its willingness to impute the knowledge
of one government agency to another, Henthorn logs could offer
important protection to prosecutors against the possibility of being
sanctioned for failure to disclose impeachment material known to
prosecutors in other districts.214 These benefits should, in the long run,
outweigh the administrative headaches associated with establishing and
maintaining a national database.
Although no single proposal on this subject will completely assuage
all of the players, taken together, these proposals should alleviate at least
some of the privacy concerns of federal agents, and, at the same time,
give defendants meaningful access to impeachment material in the files
213. This is true especially in view of the number of times agents are typically transferred from
one office to another.
214. As mentioned, prosecutors have sometimes taken it upon themselves to alert other
prosecutors of an agent's "Henthorn problem," but this has been random at best-
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of agents whose testimony and credibility will in fact be challenged at
trial.
The split between the circuits on the issue of the government's
obligation to review agents' personnel files for impeachment material has
created a plaguing anomaly that should ultimately be addressed by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Without a national standard for dealing with the
issues raised in this Article, the scope of the government's obligation to
turn over exculpatory or impeachment material in the personnel files of
federal agents depends on which circuit's law applies. If the government
is required to disclose only what it has looked for and discovered, then
the crucial question is really whether prosecutors will be made to look
for disclosable material that they will otherwise not discover. The duty to
disclose is only as meaningful as the duty to discover that which should
be disclosed.

